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FROM A "LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF MILITANTS" INTO A
"LAW FIRM FOR THE LATINO COMMUNITY"*:
MALDEF AND THE PURPOSIVE CASES OF KEYES,
RODRIGUEZ, AND PL YLER
MICHAEL A. OLIVASt
ABSTRACT
Keyes was the first school desegregation case decided by the Su-
preme Court that did not originate in a Southern city. Geography was its
quintessence-not merely the line drawing and school assignment
form-but its political geography and demography variant. In Denver, as
was the case in most Southwestern cities, the number of Mexican Ameri-
cans was as large or larger than the number of Black schoolchildren. In
several important cases taken up at approximately the same time, Anglo
community lawyers and NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
lawyers took up important cases in desegregation (Keyes v. School Dis-
trict No. 1), bilingual education (Lau v. Nichols), and Texas school fi-
nance (San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez) without
significant formal involvement by lawyers representing Latino interests.
In part, this Article argues, it was a traditional blind spot in the Black-
White legal theory that doomed the cases; even though the Chinese
American plaintiffs prevailed in Lau, it was undertaken without signifi-
cant Latino legal involvement. In addition, the Mexican American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund was not yet the major purposive legal
organization it became in the next decade, when it won significant voting
rights and immigrant education Supreme Court cases. However, it had
already begun to undertake Tenth Circuit education litigation and was
building its organizational capacity, and the failure of White lawyers in
Denver and Texas to incorporate a Mexican American theory of the case
contributed to an unsuccessful litigation strategy.
* David A. Badillo, MALDEF and the Evolution of Latino Civil Rights, RES. REP., Jan.
2005, at 4, 7 (quoting Interview with Mario Obledo, Former MALDEF President (Aug. 2003)).
t William B. Bates Distinguished Chair of Law and Director of the Institute for Higher
Education Law & Governance at the University of Houston Law Center. Since 2002, he has served
as a Director on the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) board. He
acknowledges assistance from Professors Rachel Moran and Tom Romero, George Korbel, Katy A.
Stein, and Deborah Jones, as well as the heroic efforts of the Denver University Law Review staff to
"tame this beast."
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is always a backstory to a complex lawsuit, one that clarifies
why the case was brought and, importantly, who brought it. By many
readings, Keyes v. School District No. 1' was the one that got away, sort
2of like San Antonio Independent School District v. RodrigueZ got away.
In Keyes, forced into an arranged and adversarial marriage, private law-
yers and litigants from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(LDF) overreached in retrying Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education3 in the Southwest and failed to involve Mexican American
interests in a school district that was more Latino than African American.
When the remedial plan offered by the intervenor Mexican American
Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) was largely adopted by
the district court, it repudiated the desegregation shibboleth pursued by
the plaintiff lawyers; when the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case
after vacating the plan, the Denver school district board was given a free
hand in fashioning its own remedy.4 One can only imagine how a better
1. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
2. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
3. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Swann was, in the eyes of many scholars and observers, the high-water
mark of desegregation following and implementing Brown, a short-lived pinnacle largely under-
mined by 1974's Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717 (1974), which refused to employ
cross-district or cross-jurisdictional remedies. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, Reflections on Justice Kenne-
dy's Opinion in Parents Involved: Why Fifty Years of Experience Shows Kennedy Is Right, 59 S.C.
L. REV. 735, 738 (2008).
4. Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599, 604 (S.D. Tex. 1970);
Tom 1. Romero, II, ,La Raza Latina?: Multiracial Ambivalence, Color Denial, and the Emergence
of a Tri-Ethnic Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 37 N.M. L. REV. 245, 268 (2007)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 482 (10th Cir. 1975) ("[Tlrue
'integration' of the nation's schools required the introduction of curricula that recognized Chicanalos
as members of a legally distinct non-White group. MALDEF's influence, at least on the trial court in
Keyes, was profound.... Judge Doyle's attempt to provide a remedy that recognized distinct differ-
ences in the experiences of Chicana/o students proved fleeting. Although guised in ethnic terms, the
Cardefias Plan proved incompatible with the color vision of desegregation established in the years
and decades since Brown. As the Tenth Circuit held in reversing Judge Doyle's remedy, the 'clear
implication of arguments in support of the court's adoption of the Cardenas [sic] Plan is that minori-
ty students are entitled under the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment to an educational experience tailored to
their unique cultural and development needs. Although enlightened educational theory may well
demand as much, the Constitution does not.' In short, the Tenth Circuit's opinion made it clear that
courts were to consider Chicana/os solely as an indistinguishable 'non-White' group. The Tenth
Circuit's rejection of the Cardefias Plan and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision not to grant certiorari
to review the rejection represented the end of a robust but highly problematic era in the racial con-
struction and color positioning of Latina/os in U.S. law. Represented most prominently in Keyes and
Cisneros, the articulation of Mexican Americans as a 'readily identifiable, ethnic-minority group' in
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and more successful case could have been taken up with a more compre-
hensive litigation strategy, one where the different racial and language
interests could have been coordinated with the various parties, rather
than pitted against each other with competing theories of the case. In
another matter involving Chicano students, a similar effort also failed
when an Anglo lawyer brought an ill-advised case in Rodriguez, litiga-
tion that shut off federal litigation routes and set back school finance
efforts.'
Whether or not one accepts these narratives, Keyes was a disap-
pointing underachievement, one that combined with the Milliken v. Brad-
ley litigation to end desegregation remedies for all intents and purposes.
In Rodriguez, the Court could not resolve the exceedingly complex and
rival economic models of school finance (the field was "unsettled and
disputed" and "this Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experi-
ence counsels against premature interference with the informed judg-
ments made at the state and local levels") 7 and so deferred to the states
and local schools districts by declaring that education was not a funda-
mental right. The Rodriguez case was brought in San Antonio, where
virtually all the children were Chicano, but the legal strategy decision
was made not to argue the case in racial or ethnic terms.
II. CASE STUDIES
A. Keyes v. School District No. 1
This Article is about several important civil rights cases litigated by
MALDEF in its early life as a purposive organization. Therefore, this
Article is also about how a civil rights litigation organization serving
Mexican American interests found its voice and trajectory. If, in Rodri-
guez and Keyes the relative newcomer MALDEF in the early 1970s was
uncoordinated or too late to the game to play, well-intentioned progres-
sive Anglo lawyers and the LDF can be accused of proceeding ill-
advisedly into litigation where, unlike the Southern strategy that had
prevailed in so many school desegregation cases before and after Brown
v. Board of Education (Brown 1),8 Southwestern or Western desegrega-
each instance was subsequently constitutionalized in the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions to combine
Black and Latina/o students in relation to White students in the 'tri-ethnic' school district.").
5. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 54-55.
6. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
7. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23, 42.
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown was essentially a Southern strategy, broadly construed. See
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATIONAND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY passim (2004); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL
WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 125-26 (1984); MARK V. TUSHNET,
MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1956-1961, at
150-86 (1994); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND
THE SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991, at 68-90 (1997); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 167-85 (2004); Dennis J.
Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68
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tion would inevitably have to account for the Mexican American school-
children. These children were likely to be in greater numbers than even
the African American children, and with different linguistic instructional
needs. (This flawed strategy would be even less likely to prevail when, as
in Denver (Keyes) and San Francisco (Lau v. Nichols), there were large
numbers of students speaking Asian languages as well.) This myopic,
singular focus showed most notably in Keyes, which ended up setting
desegregation against bilingual education instruction, a conundrum that
need not have occurred. The Supreme Court, even as it vacated the dis-
trict court's remedial plan that had included bilingual education instruc-
tional programs for "Hispano" children, noted what could have been,
given the similar racial histories of the two communities in the South-
west or areas with substantial numbers of Mexican Americans:
Before turning to the primary question we decide today, a word
must be said about the District Court's method of defining a "segre-
gated" school. Denver is a tri-ethnic, as distinguished from a bi-
racial, community. The overall racial and ethnic composition of the
Denver public schools is 66% Anglo, 14% Negro, and 20% Hispano.
The District Court, in assessing the question of de jure segregation in
the core city schools, preliminarily resolved that Negroes and His-
panos should not be placed in the same category to establish the seg-
regated character of a school. Later, in determining the schools that
were likely to produce an inferior educational opportunity, the court
concluded that a school would be considered inferior only if it had "a
GEO. L.J. 1, 34-44 (1986); Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the
Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L. J. 256 passim (2005); Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really
Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1867 passim (1991). In Denver,
Colorado, local White lawyers and outside LDF counsel filed suit on behalf of eight "Negro," "His-
pano," and "Anglo" families against the Denver public school board and its administration on June
19, 1969. See Brief for Respondents at 2-3, Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo.
1970) (No. 71-507), 1972 WL 136241, at *2-3; see also Keyes, 313 F. Supp. 61.
Plaintiff co-counsel Craig Barnes has written a useful first-person version of the events,
where he mentions Latinos in one paragraph: "La Raza Unida erupted out of the west side .... [Its]
leader [was] militant Hispanic Corky Gonzales .... [At a school board meeting,] Gonzales made a
passionate speech to the packed auditorium. The speech crackled with threats and tension." Craig
Barnes, A Personal Memoir of Plaintiffs' Co-counsel in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 90 DENV. U.
L. REV. 1059, 1062 (2013). After my symposium panel presentation, when I made the obvious and
verifiable point that there had been no Latino lawyers involved in the case when it was originally
filed, he vigorously upbraided me at the microphone for having said so. After his questioning, he
came up to the table and said that the plaintiffs' attorneys had "tried to get Corky to help" them and
that they had tried to get MALDEF on board, but that "MALDEF had a different theory of the case
than ours, so they refused." I confess I was nonplussed to discover that they had tried to consult non-
lawyer Corky Gonzales, whose children had all gone to parochial schools in Denver, for any legal
involvement or counsel. I said so, and responded to him, "But I think you made my point about not
involving any Latino lawyers." He said, "There weren't any others except MALDEF, and they
refused." His published version of events tellingly omits any other mention of Latino children,
MALDEF's ultimate intervention and role, or references to bilingual education or pedagogy. In
addition, I have consulted the MALDEF papers from that period, and found no written evidence of
the exchange. My version is supplemented by discussions with and writings by Peter Roos and
discussions with George Korbel, MALDEF lawyers at the time involved with these cases, as well by
discussions with Keyes historian Professor Tom Romero.
9. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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concentration of either Negro or Hispano students in the general area
of 70 to 75 percent." We intimate no opinion whether the District
Court's 70%-to-75% requirement was correct. The District Court
used those figures to signify educationally inferior schools, and there
is no suggestion in the record that those same figures were or would
be used to define a "segregated" school in the de jure context. What
is or is not a segregated school will necessarily depend on the facts of
each particular case. In addition to the racial and ethnic composition
of a school's student body, other factors, such as the racial and ethnic
composition of faculty and staff and the community and administra-
tion attitudes toward the school, must be taken into consideration.
The District Court has recognized these specific factors as elements
of the definition of a "segregated" school, and we may therefore infer
that the court will consider them again on remand.
We conclude, however, that the District Court erred in separating
Negroes and Hispanos for purposes of defining a "segregated"
school. We have held that Hispanos constitute an identifiable class
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the District
Court recognized this in classifying predominantly Hispano schools
as "segregated" schools in their own right. But there is also much ev-
idence that in the Southwest Hispanos and Negroes have a great
many things in common. The United States Commission on Civil
Rights has recently published two Reports on Hispano education in
the Southwest. Focusing on students in the States of Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas, the Commission conclud-
ed that Hispanos suffer from the same educational inequities as Ne-
groes and American Indians. In fact, the District Court itself recog-
nized that "[o]ne of the things which the Hispano has in common
with the Negro is economic and cultural deprivation and discrimina-
tion." This is agreement that, though of different origins Negroes and
Hispanos in Denver suffer identical discrimination in treatment when
compared with the treatment afforded Anglo students. In that circum-
stance, we think petitioners are entitled to have schools with a com-
bined predominance of Negroes and Hispanos included in the catego-
ry of "segregated" schools.' 0
This strategic mistake by the private lawyers and the experienced,
purposive organization LDF-perhaps miscalculating that the Court
would not take Latino interests into account if they were simply not ar-
gued-meant that MALDEF was allowed to intervene. However, its the-
ory of the case not only undermined that of the Black schoolchildren, but
these competing theories inevitably led to different proposals for the ap-
propriate remedies, ones that were treated as mutually exclusive or in-
consistent. This conflict not only countermanded the other parties' larger
vision for the Denver school district but also allowed the district to play
the two sides against each other, with its own plan emerging as the plau-
10. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 195-98 (1973) (alteration in original) (footnotes
omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 69, 74).
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sible interest-free and efficacious remedy." A different set of Anglo
lawyers and the LDF miscalculated in Rodriguez as well in briefs sup-
porting the plaintiffs, where the LDF urged that the case be treated as one
of racial discrimination, not the theory being pursued by attorney Arthur
Gochman, who had strategically chosen a different path. 12 Indeed, this
choice of a theory led the LDF to mischaracterize and misstate the dis-
trict court's holding, noting that the Rodriguez "claim based on race was
specifically upheld" by the trial court, when this was not accurate.13 it
also urged that the state's program of school finance was unconstitution-
ally racially discriminatory and that Gochman's clients had sub silentio
claimed racial discrimination: "The money differences proved by plain-
tiffs in this case are material enough to warrant judicial intervention in
light of their relationship to the other factors present, including race and
poverty" and, tellingly, "Plaintiffs are all Mexican-Americans. They
claimed relief as and for Mexican Americans."1 4
Prior to the rise of MALDEF, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and
Education Fund (PRLDEF), other organizations, and lawyers advancing
the interests of Latinos, the NAACP LDF pursued a sole and clear focus
on its African American client interests, ones that in a more plural and
diverse school universe would more likely begin to collide with the
growing exercise of Mexican American legal interests, especially if it
took up litigation in regional areas where Latinos were likely to reside or
even predominate, as in Denver. And as the Keyes case's leading schol-
ars over the years have noted, this was a case where MALDEF was ac-
corded respect and made an important entry into complex educational
litigation, but it also introduced a number of difficult issues into the bina-
ry world of Black and White school districts in the polity, including no-
menclature, terminology, forms of relief, the history of Mexican Ameri-
can schooling, and the role of Spanish-language instruction or bilingual
11. See Peter D. Roos, Bilingual Education: The Hispanic Response to Unequal Educational
Opportunity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 134-40 (1978) (discussing the tension between deseg-
regation and bilingual education). The LDF lawyers in Keyes were not Denver lawyers and were
imported from other regions of the organization.
12. Tom 1. Romero, 11, MALDEF and the Legal Investment in a Multi-colored America, 18
LA RAZA L.J. 135, 146 (2007) (footnote omitted) ("MALDEF continued to push a litigation agenda
to force courts to recognize the distinct racialization and color positioning of Mexican Americans. In
so doing, MALDEF tested the legal boundaries of a potentially more expansive color line in juris-
prudence and legal discourse by investing in the non-Whiteness and non-Blackness of the Mexican
American community. Though courts would consistently relegate Mexican Americans to an in-
between racial and ethnic space, a claim and commitment to 'brownness' would continue to animate
Mexican American legal claims to equality into the [twenty-first c]entury.").
13. See Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 7-8,
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (No. 71-1332), 1972 WL 136434, at
*7-8 [hereinafter Brief for LDFJ; see also Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp.
280, 281 (W.D. Tex 1971) (holding that the method of state financing for public elementary and
secondary education deprived plaintiffs equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution).
14. Brief for LDF, supra note 13, at 7, 14 (emphasis omitted). This charge was the mirror
image of that raised by MALDEF in its attempt to intervene in Keyes.
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education in districts where other languages were also prevalent.15 To be
sure, these were not inappropriate or unwelcome, but the entry of
MALDEF must have been as exasperating to the LDF as was the entry of
Chinese Americans into the turbulent waters of language instruction in
the San Francisco schools. MALDEF President Vilma Martinez snapped
to an interviewer that "Lau [would] be as hard to enforce as Brown v.
Board ofEducation." 
6
MALDEF lawyer Peter Roos put the best spin he could on the
Keyes remedy that was eventually put into place:
Arguments over bilingual education invariably turn into debates
about "success" as reflected in research findings. Putting aside the
inherent weaknesses in much educational research, an additional fac-
tor ought to be weighed in such discussions. It is important to under-
stand that a bilingual education program merely seeks to provide
[limited-English-proficient (LEP)] students with what others take for
granted, namely, comprehensible instruction and English proficiency.
While it is correct to hold bilingual education programs to high de-
grees of rigor and scrutiny, it should not obscure the fact that the
adoption of such a program merely is the first step in assuring educa-
tional success for LEP students. "Success" will not be achieved un-
less those additional components of any effective school instructional
program are made part of bilingual programs.
This requirement had been observed in the breach historically when
predominantly Anglo school boards and educators used the existence of
Latino schoolchildren to be traded off in demographic measures against
African American children. This bad faith measure was made possible by
plaintiffs' lawyers employing the "other-White" or "class apart" legal
strategies that had mousetrapped attorneys representing Mexican Ameri-
can children's interests and had thwarted desegregative efforts by Mexi-
can American parents over the years, where they-had objected to Mexi-
can-only schools in inferior situations.' 8
Of the remedial phase in Keyes, Roos wrote:
15. See Kristi L. Bowman, Pursuing Educational Opportunities for Latino/a Students, 88
N.C. L. REV. 911,949-58 (2010); Rachel F. Moran, Foreword-The Lessons of Keyes: How Do You
Translate the American Dream, I LA RAZA L.J. 195 passim (1986) [hereinafter Moran, Lessons of
Keyes]; Rachel F. Moran, Getting a Foot in the Door: The Hispanic Push for Equal Educational
Opportunity in Denver, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 35 passim (1992); Rachel F. Moran, Neither Black
nor White, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 61 passim (1997); Roos, supra note 11, passim.
16. Linda Mathews, Lau Ruling Sparks New Litigation, RACE REL. REP., Sept. 1974, at 38, 38
(quoting Vilma S. Martinez, President & Gen. Counsel, MALDEF) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
1 7. Peter D. Roos, Implementation of the Federal Bilingual Education Mandate: The Keyes
Case as a Paradigm, I LA RAZA L. J. 257, 276 (1986).
18. See, e.g., Steven H. Wilson, Brown over "Other White": Mexican Americans' Legal
Arguments and Litigation Strategy in School Desegregation Lawsuits, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 145
(2003); Jorge C. Rangel & Carlos M. Alcala, Comment, Project Report: De Jure Segregation of
Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 307, 342-48 (1972).
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The trial of a language rights case, like most other complex civil
rights litigation, is properly viewed in two phases. The first phase is
the "liability" phase in which the plaintiffs have the burden of estab-
lishing that the practices of the educational authority violate their
rights under law. Once that is established, and the court so rules, a
"remedial" phase is entered. Drawing upon the practice that has
evolved in desegregation litigation, the second phase typically in-
volves the presentation of a remedial plan by the school district, fol-
lowed by an opportunity for the plaintiffs to question its adequacy
and to present their own plan should the school district proposal fail.
It is appropriate at the remedial phase to include matters in a plan
whose absence might not trigger liability in the first instance. This
may be necessary to make the plaintiffs whole, and to remove "root
and branch" barriers to educational success that have evolved
through the unlawful practice. The one limitation is that the remedy
must bear some reasonable relationship to the wrong found at the lia-
bility phase.
As we approached this second phase of the case, we were con-
fronted with a decision that is common to this litigation: Do you con-
tinue with a formal litigation posture or do you attempt to reach an
agreement on the remedy? We made the determination that an
agreed-upon plan was a preferable solution and that a return to court
should occur only if the negotiations failed. At the heart of this deci-
sion was the belief that the school district would be more likely to
faithfully implement a plan for which they felt some ownership.
Conversely, it was felt that a court-imposed plan might be followed
to the letter but without the spirit to make it truly work. We thus ap-
proached the school district and the court with the proposal that we
work toward such a plan with certain fairly demanding time frames.
If negotiations did not bear fruit within these time frames, it was un-
derstood that we would feel compelled to invoke the court's process-
es. The school district and the court agreed.19
As perceptively and thoroughly documented by legal scholar Rachel
F. Moran, the structure of the various education cases leading to the
Keyes litigation in effect pitted the two groups against each other as each
maintained a different theory of the case. Moreover, the theories of the
case were not only different but at cross-purposes. Professor Moran cited
the school board attorney as inevitably attempting to play one interest off
the other:
The first challenge presented by Keyes was reconciling the man-
date to desegregate the Denver school district with the contempora-
neous effort to implement bilingual education programs. The lan-
guage claims in Keyes were brought only after a far-reaching deseg-
regation decree had been issued. [However, MALDEF] mobilized
19. Roos, supra note 11, at 268-69 (footnotes omitted).
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precisely because the decree threatened to destroy bilingual education
programs in Denver.
The [Denver school board attorney Michael] Jackson and [Peter]
Roos [viewpoints] differ markedly in their treatment of the relation-
ship between bilingual education and desegregation. Jackson states
that the school district was concerned that the court's evaluation of
instructional programs for LEP and [non-English-proficient (NEP)]
children would be prejudiced by a previous adverse holding in the
desegregation litigation. According to Jackson, his client [the Denver
school board] believed that:
[T]he earlier finding that the school district violated the
Constitution [in conjunction with the desegregation decree]
would weigh heavily in the court's consideration of the evi-
dence [regarding an entitlement to bilingual education]. Our
strategy centered on impressing upon the court the need to
consider the language rights issue independently from any
prior history of segregation. Ultimately, this proved to be
the most crucial and least successful [school board strategy].
Jackson concludes that the board did not succeed in dissociating the
language issue from the desegregation case, citing the district court's
refusal to speculate on how the language claims would have been re-
solved if they had not been part of the desegregation case.20
Professor Moran also determined that these antagonisms arose at
least in part due to the structural features of the attorney participation and
the inescapable differences in perspective between those on the inside
defending the school district and those on the outside who were motivat-
ed by their clients' historic involvement in this case and others before it:
Clearly, in Keyes, prospective implementation of the legal mandate
was as critical for the intervenors as [was] demonstrating past viola-
tions.
Although additional investigation will be necessary to substantiate
these observations, the disparity in the attorneys' concern with im-
plementation may reflect their differential participation in the reme-
dial phase of the case. The intervenors' counsel undoubtedly played a
pivotal role in negotiating the consent decree and probably enjoyed
enhanced client confidence after a recent courtroom victory. In
marked contrast, defense counsel's influence may have diminished at
the remedial stage. The defense attorneys had suffered a demoraliz-
ing loss that probably undermined their attorney-client relationship.
Moreover, they were certainly less familiar with school district af-
fairs than [were] local administrators. School personnel therefore
20. Moran, Lessons of Keyes, supra note 15, at 199-200 (seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth
alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Michael Jackson, Bilingual Education Litigation
in Denver: The School District's Perspective, I LA RAZA L.J. 250,252 (1986)).
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may have played a greater role in the negotiation process than they
had at earlier stages of the case.
... To address more comprehensively the multiplicity of interests
affected by Keyes, future research will have to examine not only the
litigators' perspectives but also those of their LEP and NEP clients,
the judge, litigators and clients demanding desegregation, and com-
munity representatives of other language groups. Only then will the
interplay of litigation strategies, judicial responses, and meaningful
reform be more fully understood.21
Thus, in Professor Moran's telling of this rich and complex Denver
story, the backstory is largely one of the civil procedure of complex liti-
gation and its political algebra, including who gets to make the decisions
among the various parties and how management of a complicated and
sprawling case favors the governmental insiders, such as the Denver
school board, who may lose at the front end but prevail in the remedy
and implementation stages. If they do so, it is not only due to the struc-
tural advantages that insiders enjoy but also due to the deeper pockets
and better access to social science expertise at the trial level and to im-
plementers at the remedy stages. MALDEF played a remarkably signifi-
cant role in the case but intervened well after the race had begun and then
had its more complex story arc of linguistic minority children, disagree-
ments among experts over the efficacy of bilingual education as an in-
structional strategy for remedying complex language interests, and a
poorly meshed or coordinated litigation plan with the original plaintiff
lawyers and community. Professor Moran has usefully catalogued these
various political features as "status conflict analysis." 2 2 Fighting on all
these fronts would have been difficult if MALDEF had undertaken the
litigation originally on its own; yet, doing so as an intervenor proved to
be fatal and ineffective because MALDEF was the resented and late-
intervening party.
In the end, MALDEF's approach in comprehensive equal educa-
tional policy litigation may have had a better chance of prevailing, de-
spite the judicial ambivalence to bilingual education as either a legal
theory or instructional remedy. 23 In today's courts, when racial assign-
21. Id. at 202-03 (footnotes omitted).
22. See Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CAL. L. REV. 321, 325
(1987).
23. For example, Dean Moran has looked at the cruel Structured Immersion Initiatives (SEI)
that have arisen in California and elsewhere, requiring that all children, no matter their language
status, be taught in English:
Whatever the debate over colorblindness as a constitutional aspiration, it is hard to
imagine how courts can be deaf to linguistic diversity. Language is far from irrelevant to
the ability to participate in the educational process, and therefore attending to linguistic
difference is an integral part of sound pedagogy. Yet, because courts afford constitutional
protection only when they find irrational animus, the safeguards for English language
learners who challenge language policy have been significantly diluted. In order to obtain
relief, these students must establish an egregious abuse of discretion. Indeed, to be ac-
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ments, even voluntary ones, have been essentially banned by subsequent
Supreme Court decisionS24 and when there are virtually no public pre-
dominantly Anglo school districts, this algorithm may be instructive in a
well-pleaded case, especially in a school district where immigration may
have played a substantial role in increasingly diverse home languages
and where there may be a state constitution that has favorable constitu-
tional traction for bringing such a case. Keyes was not such a case.
How do Keyes and Rodriguez-both ostensibly parallel cases where
MALDEF was not the lead architect, but where both the organization and
Mexican American client schoolchildren played such important
roles-intersect? The plaintiff lawyers in Keyes argued a case with three
interlocking pieces: various school board policy decisions over the years
had produced segregated schools through manipulation of residency pol-
icies, boundary lines, and the other segregatory school siting mecha-
nisms. But the Court held that many of the policies were so longstanding
and well-established (many of them over twenty-five years old), that they
were neither de jure (they occurred before Brown had outlawed them,
and there was substantial mobility in the city) nor de facto (the data were
complex and confusing): any segregation evident probably "occurred
long after these [school board] decisions were made" or "[t]he impact of
the housing patterns and neighborhood population movement stand out
as the actual culprits." 25 Plaintiffs also argued that the neighborhood
school policy, even if there was no discriminatory intent evident, should
be found unconstitutional if it led to segregation in fact, as they argued it
did.26 Finally, invoking Plessy v. Ferguson,27 they and the LDF attempt-
ed to prove to the Court that many of the Denver schools, whether de
jure or de facto segregated or racially isolated, resulted in unequal educa-
tionable, deficiencies in language instruction have to be grave enough to deny children a
meaningful opportunity to learn.
This traditional civil rights framework ignores significant differences between lan-
guage and race. Courts already have recognized the constitutive role of language in other
legal contexts. In these cases, the focus is not on equality but on liberty. Judges have been
steadfast in recognizing a parent's right to bring up a child free of undue governmental
interference, and an integral part of this freedom is the capacity to transmit the patrimony
of language and culture. These decisions raise the possibility that courts should evaluate
SEI initiatives by considering both the equality and liberty interests that are implicated. In
particular, public schools could be required to uphold a principle of equal liberties that
would protect a linguistic minority parent's right to participate in shaping his or her
child's education on the same terms as other parents do. SEI initiatives, by substantially
constraining a parent's voice in instructional decisions, arguably would violate this norm
of basic fairness.
Rachel F. Moran, Equal Liberties and English Language Learners: The Special Case of Structured
Immersion Initiatives, 54 How. L.J. 397, 398-99 (2011).
24. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709-11
(2007) (disallowing voluntary racial transfer policy); see also Brown, supra note 3, at 739-40.
25. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 75-76 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), modified and remanded, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
26. See id. at 63-64.
27. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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tional opportunity. 28 Thus, they argued for Swann-style or other relief, no
matter the underlying cause.2 9
Importantly, although the Court gave short shrift to the first two
pieces, it did hone in on the third piece, determining that "segregation,
regardless of its cause, is a major factor in producing inferior schools and
unequal educational opportunity." 30 Thus, in a remedy that would mirror
Rodriguez-like equality measures, the Court produced more than a dozen
tables of statistical data measuring the inequalities among the various
schools, noting that in almost all cases the matches showed minority
schools were receiving fewer resources. 3 ' To determine unconstitutional
inequality, the Court contrasted the minority-racially isolated school data
with the predominantly White school data along five measures: three
educational input measures (teacher experience, teacher turnover, and
school facilities) and two outcome measures (student achievement and
dropout rates). It also minimized the role of busing-the then-preferred
form of remedy-in any remedial plan: "In connection with equalizing
the educational opportunity, it is not so clear that compulsory transporta-
tion is the answer."32
At the end of the day, upon its remand, the district court found that
the intentional segregation demonstrated in parts of the city rendered the
entire Denver system an unconstitutionally segregated system, and the
court adopted a system-wide desegregation plan.33 On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit upheld the district court's holding that there was evident district
liability and affirmed the student assignment and transportation plan. 3 4
Here is the intersection between the two theories: while the district court
determined that segregation played a key role in producing inequality, it
did not believe that the actual remedy necessitated traditional desegrega-
28. See Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 63-64; see also id. at 83 (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537).
29. Swann was clearly the backdrop of this point, even though it was not prominently argued,
perhaps because it grew from a Southern de jure segregated setting. See Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1971).
Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially ordering as-
signment of students on a racial basis. All things being equal, with no history of discrimi-
nation, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all
things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained to
enforce racial segregation. The remedy for such segregation may be administratively
awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens on
some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim period
when remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate the dual school systems. No
fixed or even substantially fixed guidelines can be established as to how far a court can
go, but it must be recognized that there are limits. The objective is to dismantle the dual
school system.
Id. at 28 (footnote omitted).
30. Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 82.
31. See id. at 78-85.
32. Id. at 84.
33. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Supp. 673, 682-83 (D. Colo. 1974), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975).
34. See Keyes, 521 F.2d at 479.
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tion rather than compensatory educational measures. 35 The remedy elided
the original theory brought by the plaintiff lawyers, and although it did
not embrace the detailed and comprehensive relief plan proffered by
MALDEF, it did adopt MALDEF's theory of relief: that there be a relief
irrespective of causal factors and that it should look like compensatory
educational measures, such as those that were likely to arise in school
equity finance.36
But to those keeping track of entrepreneurial policy winners and
losers, it is inarguable that MALDEF came out of the Keyes, Lau, and
Rodriguez cases tempered in the crucible of high-stakes litigation, and
while the organization had not prevailed, it had endured. As for the long-
term efficacy of its status, by the time Denver finally mopped up all the
Keyes litigation issues in 1983-1984,37 MALDEF had already become
the chief architect of an even more fundamental issue, and an education-
policy entrepreneur on the growing issue of undocumented schoolchil-
dren, by prevailing in Plyler v. Doe.38
B. Plyler v. Doe 39
In 1975, the State of Texas enacted section 21.031 of the Texas Ed-
ucation Code, allowing its public school districts--called independent
school districts (ISDs) in Texas-to charge tuition to undocumented
children. The legislature held no hearings on the matter, and no pub-
lished record explains the origin of this revision to the school code. Dis-
35. See Keyes, 380 F. Supp. at 682.
36. See id. at 684-89.
37. See Keyes, 380 F. Supp. at 682-83. A number of years ensued, with the various parties
quarreling over the remedy and its implementation. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 540 F. Supp.
399 (D. Colo. 1982). After many years of presiding over the parties disagreeing over the appropriate
instructional remedy (in English, Spanish, and Asian languages), district court Judge Richard Matsch
issued a Memorandum of Opinion on December 30, 1983, in which the LDF was not even a party,
with Peter Roos, MALDEF, and META lawyers representing the Congress of Hispanic Educators, et
al., as plaintiff-intervenors. The judge noted:
A failure to take appropriate action to remove language barriers to equal participa-
tion in educational programs is a failure to establish a unitary school system.
On December 16, 1982, an order was entered appointing three persons as the Com-
pliance Assistance Panel and at a hearing held on January 4, 1983, it was established that
the panel would attempt to work with the district on the ten matters identified in an earlier
order to show cause as necessary steps toward developing a final order in this case. While
this court has some awareness that there have been contacts by the panel members with
the Board of Education and administrative staff of the district, there has been no formal
submission to this court on any of those items.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 576 F. Supp. 1503, 1522 (1983). The district court ordered a January 1984
hearing. Id.
38. 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, No UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT
BEHIND: PLYLER V. DOE AND THE EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED SCHOOLCHILDREN passim
(2012).
39. This Part II.B utilizes my chapter, Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, the Education of
Undocumented Children, and the Polity, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 197 (David Martin & Peter
Schuck eds., 2005). 1 revisit and add to this chapter in this Part in order to explore the larger context
of Mexican American school litigation at the times Keyes was being argued. The material was re-
printed from Immigration Stories with permission of West Academic Publishing.
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cussions with legislators from that time have suggested that it was insert-
ed into a larger, more routine education bill, simply at the request of
some border-area superintendents who mentioned the issue to their rep-
resentatives.4 0 The statute, in pertinent part, read:
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally
admitted aliens and who are over the age of five years and under the
age of 21 years on the first day of September of any scholastic year
shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available School Fund for that
year.
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or
a legally admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and not
over the age of 21 years on the first day of September of the year in
which admission is sought shall be permitted to attend the public free
schools of the district in which he resides or in which his parent,
guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides at the
time he applies for admission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this
state shall admit into the public free schools of the district free of tui-
tion all persons who are either citizens of the United States or legally
admitted aliens and who are over five and not over 21 years of age at
the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his parent,
guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school
district.4
Even though they were entitled under the statute to do so, not all the
state's school boards chose to charge tuition. The state's largest district,
Houston ISD (with over 200,000 students), and a smaller one, Tyler
(with approximately 16,000 students) allowed them to enroll but required
parents or guardians to pay $1,000 annually for each child. In addition,
several of the school districts nearest the border, such as Ysleta ISD
(near El Paso and across the border from Ciudad Juarez) and Brownsville
ISD (across the border from Matamoros), reported they had excluded
these children from enrolling, as did the state's second largest district,
Dallas ISD, many hundreds of miles from the border.
40. In the Houston case challenging this statute, the federal court trial judge found:
The court cannot state with absolute certainty what the Legislature intended when passing
the amendment to 21.031. Neither the court nor the parties have uncovered a shred of leg-
islative history accompanying the 1975 amendment. There was no debate in the Legisla-
ture before the amendment was passed by a voice vote. There were no studies preceding
the introduction of the legislation to determine the impact that undocumented children
were having on the schools or to project the fiscal implications of the amendment.
In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 555 n.19 (S.D. Tex. 1980). The record, such as
it is, showed that the legislation likely arose after a Texas attorney general opinion held that prior to
1975, the Texas education law did not differentiate among children based upon their immigration
status. Alien Children Entitled to Attend Public Schools, Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. H-586, 3 (1975).
41. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1994) (repealed by Acts of 1995, 74th Leg., ch.
260 (May 30, 1995)).
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The first challenge to section 21.031 was Hernandez v. Houston In-
dependent School District,4 2 filed in spring 1977 in state court by a local
Houston attorney, Peter Williamson. The district court and the court of
civil appeals rejected the due process and equal protection arguments
against the statute, and in November 1977, the appeals court held that
such legislation was reasonable: "The determination to share [the state's]
bounty, in this instance tuition-free education, may take into account the
character of the relationship between the alien and this country."4 3
While there was some localized resistance across the state to the
practice of charging tuition for what was generally referred to as "free
public schools" and from which absence constituted truancy under Texas
law, the issue appears to have come to MALDEF's attention just prior to
a September 26, 1977 letter from Joaquin G. Avila, director of the San
Antonio office of MALDEF, to the MALDEF National Director for Edu-
cation Litigation, Peter Roos. He wrote:
This statute was made effective on August 29, 1977. Basically, this
statute seeks to regulate the number of students who move in with
relatives to attend another school district. As the amended statute
now provides (Section 21.03 1(a)), a student who lives apart from his
parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control of him under
an order of a court, must demonstrate that his presence in the school
district was not based primarily on his or her desire to attend a par-
ticular school district. In other words, if a case of hardship can be es-
tablished, a student will be able to attend the school district. Other-
wise, the relatives will have to secure a court order of guardianship.
This requirement will impose a hardship on those families who can-
not afford an attorney to process a guardianship. So far we have not
received any complaints only a request by Pete Tijerina, our first
general counsel to launch a lawsuit.
What are your feelings on the constitutionality of such a provision.
What would we have to show to demonstrate a disparate impact.
Please advise at your earliest convenience.
42. 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
43. Id. at 125. The case was tried in Austin rather than in Houston because of the administra-
tive proceedings required to challenge the state administrative agency.
44. Letter from Joaquin G. Avila, Dir. of San Antonio Office, MALDEF, to Peter Roos, Nat'l
Dir. of Educ. Litig., MALDEF (Sept. 26, 1977) (on file with Stanford University Cecil H. Green
Library) [hereinafter Letter from Avila to Roos]. I found a copy of the letter in the Stanford Univer-
sity Cecil H. Green Library special collections room. The concordance to these records is RESEARCH
GUIDE TO THE RECORDS OF MALDEF/PRLDEF (Theresa Mesa Casey & Pedro Hernandez eds.,
1996). Additional files from early MALDEF work in Houston are available in the archives of the
Houston Metropolitan Research Center (HMRC), particularly the Abraham Ramirez collection, used
extensively by Guadalupe San Miguel Jr. to explain earlier Houston school desegregation cases and
bilingual education issues in his excellent study, BROWN, NOT WHITE: SCHOOL INTEGRATION AND
THE CHICANO MOVEMENT IN HOUSTON (2001). Ramirez was a local civil rights attorney who was
affiliated with MALDEF in its early years, although he was not an employee. See OLIVAS, supra
note 38, at 107 n. 10. For additional studies of Houston schooling, see generally WILLIAM HENRY
KELLAR, MAKE HASTE SLOWLY: MODERATES, CONSERVATIVES, AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN
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This letter contains the spores of the Plyler case (without referenc-
ing the Hernandez litigation that was underway in the state courts in
Houston at the same time), even though Avila does not appear to have
appreciated the full dimensions of the matter that had been flagged by
MALDEF board member (and one of the organization's founders in the
mid-1960s) Pete Tijerina. To Avila, the issue kicked up to San Francisco
was whether the revised Texas statute improperly affected the residency
of undocumented students by requiring the parents or formal legal guard-
ians to reside in the district. This was a related issue but one far less es-
sential to the algebra of undocumented school attendance than was the
tuition issue presented eventually in Plyler, especially for school districts
located in the interior, away from the border. Indeed, a year after Plyler
ruled in favor of the schoolchildren, the exact issue Avila noted in his
letter reached the Supreme Court in Martinez v. Bynum,45 where it was
resolved in favor of the school districts involved.4 6 By that time, howev-
er, the more fundamental and important threshold issue had been settled;
all else was detail.
But this was not clear in 1977, when Roos began to discover the full
extent of the practice in Texas and other states, even those without such
statutes but where border districts unevenly enforced residency and tru-
ancy rules. He looked especially at the Southwestern and Western states,
where most undocumented families resided, where undocumented Mexi-
can immigration was most pronounced (as opposed to undocumented
immigration from other countries and other hemispheres), and where
MALDEF concentrated most of its program activities. After experiences
as amici in Keyes,4 7 Serrano v. Priest,48 and other cases, and as attorneys
in Rodriguez4 9 and Serna v. Portales,so a case tried in New Mexico fed-
HOUSTON passim (1999); ANGELA VALENZUELA, SUBTRACTIVE SCHOOLING: U.S.-MEXICAN
YOUTH AND THE POLITICS OF CARING passim (1999).
45. 461 U.S. 321 (1983). In order to end this practice, Congress in 1996 enacted what is now
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § Il84(m) (2012).
46. Martinez, 461 U.S. at 321.
47. See Brief Amici Curiae, Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (No. 71-507),
1972 WL 137533.
48. 487 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Cal. 1971) (noting Mario Obledo, a co-founder of MALDEF, as
amici curiae on behalf of the appellants).
49. Brief for Appellees, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (No.
71-1332), 1971 WL 134333 (noting Mario Obledo, a co-founder of MALDEF, as an attorney for the
appellees).
50. 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974). MALDEF took this New Mexico bilingual education case
to the Tenth Circuit, applying Swann's theory, and prevailed, an early and important success.
There was adequate evidence that appellants' proposed program was only a token plan
that would not benefit appellees. Under these circumstances the trial court had a duty to
fashion a program which would provide adequate relief for Spanish surnamed children.
As the Court noted in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, "Once a
right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable reme-
dies." Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 appellees have a right to bilingual
education. And in following the spirit of Swann, we believe the trial court, under its in-
herent equitable power, can properly fashion a bilingual-bicultural program which will
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eral court and in the Tenth Circuit by MALDEF lawyers, the organiza-
tion had been searching for an appropriate Texas federal court vehicle to
consolidate its modest victories in the many small state court cases it had
taken on in its first decade of existence. It had also taken White v.
Regesters to a successful round in the U.S. Supreme Court, only to see
the follow-up remand fall short of its desirable outcome.5 2 Unlike the
more experienced focus of its role model, the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, which had strategically targeted desegregation as its reason for
being, MALDEF had been somewhat behind the curve, in part due to its
representation of ethnic and national-origin interests for Mexican Ameri-
cans; in part due to the diffuse focus that derived from representing the
linguistic, political, racial, financial, and even class interests of its varie-
gated clients; and in part due to its incomplete involvement in these cas-
es, where it aligned with other organizations but did not have full strate-
gic reins or controls on the approach and strategy of the cases.
If it aspired to become a regular player in the elite U.S. Supreme
Court litigation bar and civil rights world, MALDEF would have to take
up its own cases, and win, and then preserve its wins down the road,
making their stories known and their causes important to the larger
world. After all, Mexican Americans in court were not African Ameri-
cans, although their histories of oppression and exclusion from American
Anglo life were more similar than they were dissimilar, especially in
"Jaime Crow" Texas, the Mexican American Mississippi. 3 Even after
assure that Spanish surnamed children receive a meaningful education. We believe the
trial court has formulated a just, equitable and feasible plan; accordingly we will not alter
it on appeal.
Id. at 1154 (10th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)).
51. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
52. Id. at 755 ("In this litigation challenging the Texas 1970 legislative reapportionment
scheme, a three-judge District Court held that the House plan, statewide, contained constitutionally
impermissible deviations from population equality, and that the multimember districts provided for
Bexar and Dallas Counties invidiously discriminated against cognizable racial or ethnic groups.
Though the entire plan was declared invalid, the court permitted its use for the 1972 election except
for its injunction order requiring those two county multimember districts to be reconstituted into
single-member districts."); see also Paul W. Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-Large Elections:
The Dilution Problem, 10 GA. L. REV. 353, 382-87 (1976) (discussing the facts of White). But see
White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935, 935-36 (1975) (per curiam) ("We are informed that the State of
Texas has adopted new apportionment legislation providing single-member districts to replace the
multimember districts which are at issue before us in this case. That statute by its terms does not
become effective until the 1976 elections, and intervening special elections to fill vacancies, if any,
will be held in the districts involved as constituted on January 1, 1975. Rather than render an unnec-
essary judgment on the validity of the constitutional views expressed by the District Court in this
case, which we do not undertake to do at this time, we vacate the judgment of the District Court and
remand the case to that court for reconsideration in light of the recent Texas reapportionment legisla-
tion and for dismissal if the case is or becomes moot."); see also White v. Regester, JUSTIA.COM,
http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/422/935/case.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2013) ("In light of
recent Texas apportionment legislation substituting single-member election districts for the multi-
member districts at issue, the District Court's judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to that
court for reconsideration and for dismissal if the case is or becomes moot.").
53. See Wilson, supra note 18, at 193; see also IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE passim (1996); Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican Amer-
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1954's Hernandez v. Texas5 4 and earlier cases brought in the U.S. Su-
preme Court had addressed discrimination, MALDEF entered several
cases and was required to educate courts on the poor educational oppor-
tunities available to Mexican Americans. 5 Historian Steven H. Wilson
has noted the origins of the different litigation theories employed by the
two groups to combat school segregation:
The ... creation of MALDEF had less to do with the shift in think-
ing [about school desegregation strategies] than might be expected.
The upheavals brought by the black civil rights struggle, the farm
workers' movement, and antiwar protests inspired many disaffected
Mexican-descended youths to adopt similar goals and direct action
tactics-such as walkouts and other disruptive demonstrations-in
order to combat the inequities they encountered. As a result, howev-
er, activists frequently found themselves sanctioned by school admin-
istrators or even law enforcement agencies. Instead of suing schools
to change the rules of desegregation, therefore, MALDEF undertook
a number of cases that established the new organization as something
of an unofficial civil liberties bureau for militant Chicano students.
Significantly, in these cases, MALDEF's attorneys did not argue-
and in civil liberties cases had no reason to claim-that Mexican
Americans were and ought to be considered a group distinct from
Anglos. Nevertheless, MALDEF's early victories in this field helped
to reestablish litigation as a tool for vindicating Mexican Americans'
civil rights.56
Evidence from the MALDEF side of the Plyler case clearly indicat-
ed that Roos and MALDEF President Vilma Martinez, a young Texas
icans as a Legally Cognizable Class Under Rule 23 and the Equal Protection Clause, 50 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 393 passim (1975); lan F. Haney Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of
Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1143, 1151-52 (1998); Margaret E. Montoya, A Brief
History of Chicanalo School Segregation: One Rationale for Affirmative Action, 12 LA RAZA L.J.
159, 163 (2001); Clare Sheridan, "Another White Race": Mexican Americans and the Paradox of
Whiteness in Jury Selection, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 109, 112 (2003); cf Vicki L. Ruiz, "We Always
Tell Our Children They Are Americans ": Mendez v. Westminster and the Cahfornia Road to Brown
v. Board of Education, C. BOARD REV., Fall 2003, at 20, 22-23, 25 (describing the history of dis-
crimination in California).
54. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
55. See "COLORED MEN" AND "HOMBRES AQUi": HERNANDEZ v. TEXAS AND THE EMERGENCE
OF MEXICAN AMERICAN LAWYERING 131-33 (Michael A. Olivas ed., 2006). On this point, legal
historian Romero has noted, in the matter of Keyes:
[I]t is no surprise that color consciousness played a central role in MALDEF's under-
standing of law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, the remainder of my essay briefly ex-
plores the manner by which MALDEF began to conceptualize the non-Whiteness of
Mexican Americans as a matter of law. My analysis is therefore suggestive of not only an
important transformation in the color consciousness for many in the Mexican American
community, but of an emerging critique of the Black-White paradigm in American law.
Indeed, as numerous Mexican Americans legally invested themselves in their non-White
color status, largely but not exclusively as Chicana/os, the legal strategy pursued by
MALDEF at this foundational moment reflected the extent that many in the community
remained similarly committed to a categorization that recognized Chicana/os' distinctive
status as a non-White and non-Black group.
Romero, II, supra note 12, at 136-37.
56. Wilson, supra note 18, at 193 (footnote omitted).
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lawyer who had begun her civil rights career with the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, soon saw the case as the Mexican American Brown v.
Board of Education: a comprehensive vehicle for consolidating attention
to the various strands of social exclusions that kept Mexican-origin per-
sons in subordinate status. This case promised to improve the lot of Mex-
ican migrant workers and to address Texas school practices, long consid-
ered the most insensitive to Mexicans and Mexican Americans. It incor-
porated elements of school leadership and community relations, where
the political powerlessness of Chicanos was evident even in geographic
areas where they were the predominant population. The tuition dimen-
sion resurrected school finance and governance issues that had earlier
been raised by Chicano plaintiffs, seeking to have the radically unequal
school financing scheme in Texas declared unconstitutional. After initial
success, Chicano plaintiffs lost in a controversial and disappointing 1973
decision, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.57 The
ruling seemed designed to call a halt to any expansions in the use of the
equal protection doctrine, and it specifically declared that education was
not a fundamental right that would trigger strict scrutiny under that
clause. MALDEF was not the architect and only a supportive player in
the Rodriguez litigation, although the plaintiffs were Mexican American
families in San Antonio, then the headquarters and birthplace of the or-
ganization. And importantly, Plyler involved immigration status and
even held out the promise to unite the class interests between immigrant
Mexicans and the larger, more established Mexican American communi-
ty in a way that earlier, important cases litigating jury selection, school
finance, and desegregation had not been designed to achieve. 5 9 Although
57. For a detailed history of the case, see generally Michael Heise, The Story of San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez: School Finance, Local Control, and Constitutional Limits, in
EDUCATION LAW STORIES 51, 51-82 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2008).
58. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37-38 ("We have carefully considered each of the arguments
supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have
found those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect we find this a particularly inappropriate
case in which to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The present case, in another basic
sense, is significantly different from any of the cases in which the Court has applied strict scrutiny to
state or federal legislation touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of our prior cases
involved legislation which 'deprived,' 'infringed,' or 'interfered' with the free exercise of some such
fundamental personal right or liberty.").
59. George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion, and the Mexican Ameri-
can Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 555 passim (1994); see also NEIL
FOLEY, THE WHITE SCOURGE: MEXICANS, BLACKS, AND POOR WHITES IN TEXAS COTTON CULTURE
8 (1997) (describing the unity of class interests); MARIO T. GARCiA, MEXICAN AMERICANS:
LEADERSHIP, IDEOLOGY & IDENTITY, 1930-1960, passim (1989); Christopher Arriola, Knocking on
the Schoolhouse Door: Mendez v. Westminster, Equal Protection, Public Education, and Mexican
Americans in the 1940s, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 166 passim (1995); Delgado & Palacios, supra note 53,
passim; Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Cates, Jr., Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 662 passim (1975); Juan F. Perea, Buscando Ameri-
ca: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420 passim
(2004) (arguing "that there is a strong assimilative bias toward Whiteness and the English language
both in our educational system and in the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence" and "that
the Equal Protection Clause, as currently implemented through assimilation and integration, actually
denies equality to Latinos, many of whom are native or bilingual Spanish speakers"); cf GEORGE J.
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these cases all occurred in Texas over many years-before and after the
1967-1968 birth of MALDEF-and had even included some significant
victories, they had not appreciably improved the status of Chicanos or
broken down the barriers for large numbers of the community.
In his pathbreaking study of Mexican American education litigation,
historian Guadalupe San Miguel analyzed the lawsuits undertaken by
MALDEF in Texas in the years 1970-1981, its earliest record. MALDEF
undertook ninety-three federal and state court cases in the state during
those years and compiled a substantial record across several areas: seven-
ty-one cases in the area of desegregation (76.3%), four in employment
(4.3%), three in school finance (3.2%), seven in political rights (7.5%),
six in voting (6.5%), and two other education cases (2.2%); in addition, a
number of the cases included collateral issues such as language rights
and bilingual education. 60 As an example of these cases, MALDEF un-
dertook United States v. Texas,6 1 a comprehensive assault upon the worst
exclusionary practices by school districts, such as class assignment prac-
tices and inadequate bilingual education.62 The judge in that district court
decision noted with some bite: "Serious flaws permeate every aspect of
the state's effort. . . . Since the defendants have not remedied these seri-
ous deficiencies, meaningful relief for the victims of unlawful discrimi-
nation must be instituted by court decree."6 3 The case, which began in
1970, ended with a whimper on September 27, 2010, with a final order
from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, 4 following
an April 12, 2010 revised order from the Fifth Circuit.6 5 For any lawyer-
ing organization, forty years is a long time to oversee, even loosely, a
court case.
SANCHEZ, BECOMING MEXICAN AMERICAN: ETHNICITY, CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN CHICANO Los
ANGELES, 1900-1945, at 87-128 (1993) (describing the different class interests between Mexican-
Americans and Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles).
60. GUADALUPE SAN MIGUEL, JR., "LET ALL OF THEM TAKE HEED": MEXICAN AMERICANS
AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY IN TEXAS, 1910-1981, at 174 tbl.10 (1987); see
also Rangel & Alcala, supra note 18, passim. I also examined in April 2007 and October 2010 all
MALDEF board minutes and annual reports stored in the Los Angeles national headquarters.
61. 506 F. Supp. 405, 428 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982).
62. Id.
63. Id. The judge in this case was William Wayne Justice. Id. at 408. It is not surprising that
such anti-Mexican legislation and practices would have originated in Texas, a jurisdiction widely
regarded to be officially inhospitable to its Mexican-origin population. See ARNOLDO DE LE6N,
THEY CALLED THEM GREASERS: ANGLO ATTITUDES TOWARD MEXICANS IN TEXAS, 1821-1900,
passim (1983); DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836-
1986, passim (1987); CYNTHIA E. OROzCo, NO MEXICANS, WOMEN, OR DOGS ALLOWED: THE RISE
OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT passim (2009); RICHARD R. VALENCIA,
CHICANO STUDENTS AND THE COURTS: THE MEXICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR EDUCATIONAL
EQUALITY passim (2008); cf MARCOS PIZARRO, CHICANAS AND CHICANOS IN SCHOOL: RACIAL
PROFILING, IDENTITY BATTLES, AND EMPOWERMENT passim (2005) (describing anti-Mexican legis-
lation and practices in Los Angeles, California, and Washington state).
64. United States v. Texas, No. 0840858, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2010)
65. United States v. Texas, No. 0840858, slip op. at 33-34 (5th Cir. Apr. 12, 2010).
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Over the years, MALDEF had joined forces with other Mexican
American organizations, including more conservative groups such as the
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the American
G.I. Forum, organizations active over the years in assimilationist and
citizenship issues and Latino military veteran issues. Thus, these national
organizations, all founded in Texas to combat discrimination, merged
their divergent interests in order to effect solidarity and have since served
as plaintiffs in cases filed by MALDEF, as have other regional and local
Latino organizations.66
Just as Thurgood Marshall had traveled the South to execute the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund's longstanding strategic approach toward
dismantling segregated schooling and the American apartheid system by
seeking out the proper cases and plaintiffs, Martinez, Roos, and other
MALDEF lawyers and board members had been seeking just the right
federal case. They wanted to have a larger impact than they could expect
from dozens of smaller cases in various state courts in the Southwest. If
Mexican American plaintiffs could not win the school finance case in
Rodriguez, with such demonstrable economic disparities as had been
evident in that trial, MALDEF needed to win a big one, both to establish
its credibility within and without the Chicano community and to best
serve its clients. If a winning MALDEF case eventually disappointed, as
in Regester, it needed to gain traction beyond the first round victory, so
as to be-and importantly to seem to be-an important player over the
67
long haul. This case, involving vulnerable schoolchildren in rural Texas
being charged a thousand dollars for what was available to other children
for free, seemed that it might be that vehicle. The MALDEF lawyers
66. For example, United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981), was formally
styled United States of America, Plaintiff, Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, LULAC, and
G.I. Forum, Plaintiffs-Intervenors v. State of Texas et al., Defendants. Id. For histories of these
organizations, see generally CARL ALLSUP, THE AMERICAN G.I. FORUM: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION
passim (1982); BENJAMIN MARQUEZ, LULAC: THE EVOLUTION OF A MEXICAN AMERICAN
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION passim (1993); SUZANNE OBOLER, ETHNIC LABELS, LATINO LIVES:
IDENTITY AND THE POLITICS OF (RE)PRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES passim (1995);
OROZCO, supra note 63, passim; HENRY A. J. RAMOS, THE AMERICAN GI FORUM: IN PURSUIT OF
THE DREAM, 1948-1983,passim (1998); Laura E. Gomez, The Birth of the "Hispanic" Generation:
Attitudes of Mexican-American Political Elites Toward the Hispanic Label, 75 LATIN AM. PERSP. 45
passim (1992); cf Suzanne Oboler, The Politics of Labeling: Latino/a Cultural Identities ofSelfand
Others, 75 LATIN AM. PERSP. 18 passim (1992) (describing how immigrants from different Latin
American countries identify with the label "Hispanic").
67. White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935 (1975). My understanding of this case was greatly en-
hanced by former VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America) attorney and former MALDEF lawyer
George Korbel, who filed a brief for MALDEF in the 1975 Regester case, only to be fired soon after
in what he termed a "political bloodbath pushed by Ford" to relocate the national office to San
Francisco. In several written and telephone exchanges in December 2012, he gave me generous time
and details from the political squabbling that occurred during this period. Telephone Interviews with
George Korbel, Former Attorney, MALDEF (Dec. 2012). His version of events was quite critical,
but accurately dovetailed with several other accounts of that time, including discussions I have had
with other present and former MALDEF staff. In full disclosure, I am a current MALDEF board
member, although all conclusions I draw are my own and do not represent the organization or its
leadership.
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found their Linda Brown in Tyler, Texas, where brothers and sisters in
the same family held different immigration statuses. Some had been
born in Mexico, and those born in Texas held birthright U.S. citizen-
ship.69 Perhaps more importantly, they found their Earl Warren in federal
district court Judge William Wayne Justice, widely admired and reviled
for his liberal views and progressive decisions.70 Thus, in this small rural
town of Tyler, Texas, the stage was set.
The first issue to arise after the case was filed was whether the chil-
dren could be styled in an anonymous fashion in the caption and conduct
of the case, so that their identities and those of their families would not
be divulged. Use of the actual names of the plaintiffs in the earlier Her-
nandez case in state court against the Houston schools had placed all of
them at risk of deportation. In the Tyler case, even though Judge Justice
permitted the case to proceed with "John Doe" plaintiffs, the risk persist-
ed. The U.S. Attorney had apparently asked the Dallas District Director
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to conduct discre-
tionary immigration sweeps in the area that would have intimidated the
families into dropping their suit.7 ' In response, Roos wrote to the head of
68. The families represented in this civil action have lived in the City of Tyler for a period of
three to thirteen years. Each such family includes at least one child, not of school age, who is a
citizen of the United States by virtue of his or her birth in the United States. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F.
Supp. 569, 574 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
69. Id.
70. For example, Judge Justice was the trial judge in United Slates v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405
(E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 680 F. 2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982), in which he found Texas and the school
districts to have been out of compliance with regard to school desegregation and English language
instruction obligations under federal law. Id. at 441-42. For examples of his long record of progres-
sive decisions, see JOHN J. DILULio, GOVERNING PRISONS 115 (1987); id. at 212-15 (describing
Judge Justice's role in Texas prison reform). For this record, he earned an impeachment bill, intro-
duced on June 24, 1981, but never passed. H.R. 168, 97th Cong. (1981); see also FRANK R.
KEMERER, WILLIAM WAYNE JUSTICE: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 94-98 (1991) (describing hostility
towards Judge Justice and his family resulting from his record). He died in October 2009, with
virtually all the obituaries citing his role in the Plyler case. See Albert H. Kauffman, Judge William
Wayne Justice: A Life of Human Dignity and Refractory Mules, 41 ST. MARY'S L. J. 215, 216 n.1, 5
& 7 (2009). On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the case, the judge said of his ruling: "I think it's the
most important case I ever decided." Katherine Leal Unmuth, 25 Years Ago, Tyler Case Opened
Schools to Illegal Migrants, DALL. MORNING NEWS, June 11, 2007, at IA. The University of Texas
School of Law maintains a website dedicated to him, with many of his papers, stories, decisions, etc.
The William Wayne Justice Papers, UNIV. TEX. AUSTIN TARLTON L. LIBR.,
http://tarlton.law.utexas.edulexhibits/ww justice/doe v_plyler.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
71. The plaintiff in that early case was named Carlos Hernandez. See the letter from Peter
Roos to Leonel Castillo where he warns, "We have been informed that the local United States Attor-
ney, John Hannah, has requested the Director of [the Dallas INS] to take steps to deport the plaintiffs
in this case and possibly to conduct a sweep in the Tyler region." Letter from Peter Roos, Nat'l Dir.
of Educ. Litig., MALDEF, to Leonel Castillo, Comm'r of Immigration & Naturalization, U.S. Dep't
of Just. (Sept. 13, 1977) (on file with Stanford University Cecil H. Green Library). This issue arose
in another MALDEF case in which undocumented college students in Virginia who brought an
action concerning a state statute that denied state college access to undocumented students sought to
file their case anonymously. The judge ruled against them on this issue. Doe I et al. v. Merten, 219
F.R.D. 387, 396 (E.D. Va. 2004). And then he ruled against them on the larger issue, once alterna-
tive plaintiff organizations were enlisted as substitutes, holding that the State of Virginia could enact
practices which denied undocumented students admission or residency status. Equal Access Educ. v.
Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655, 660 (E.D. Va. 2004) (finding that students did not have standing,
absent evidence that institution denied admission on perceived immigration status); see also Nathan
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the INS in Washington, requesting that he call off any planned raids and
characterizing them as "trial-tampering," a serious charge. As it hap-
pened, in this endeavor MALDEF enjoyed a run of luck, which is always
an ingredient of successful trials. The then-INS Commissioner was Leo-
nel Castillo, a native of Houston and a prominent Mexican American
politician with progressive politics, himself a former Peace Corps volun-
teer who was married to an immigrant. At his direction, the INS under-
took no raids during the trial. After these preliminary skirmishes, Judge
Justice issued an injunction on September 11, 1977, enjoining the Tyler
ISD from enforcing section 21.031 against any children on the basis of
72their immigration status.
Meanwhile, as a part of the overall trial strategy, Roos, Martinez,
and other MALDEF officials began to press public opinion leaders to
support the schoolchildren and to develop a backstory of public ac-
ceptance of their schooling and immigration status. As an example, in
October 1977, Roos wrote leaders of the National Education Association
(NEA), the progressive national teachers union to request support and
assistance; NEA later filed a brief and provided additional support to
MALDEF. In addition, MALDEF leaders traveled to meet with other
Latino organizational leaders to enlist support and solicit resources and
to encourage legal organizations to file amicus briefs on behalf of the
plaintiff children.
On September 14, 1978, after a two-day hearing, Judge Justice is-
sued his opinion, striking down section 21.031 as applied to the Tyler
ISD. He found that the state's justifications for the statute were not ra-
tional and violated equal protection, and that the attempt to regulate im-
migration at the state level violated the doctrine of preemption, which
holds immigration to be a function solely of federal law.73 Immediately
after, the state moved for leave to reopen the case, citing the decision's
implications for other school districts in the state and seeking a chance to
bolster the record. Observers have suggested that the state had simply
underestimated the plaintiffs' case, inasmuch as the judge in the Hernan-
Cortez, The Local Dilemma: Preemption and the Role of Federal Standards in State and Local
Immigration Laws, 61 SMU L. REv. 47, 50 (2008); Amy Argetsinger, Va. Student Unsure of His
Standing; Colleges' Views Differ on Immigrant's Status, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2004, at B.
72. In the Plyler trial court case and at the Fifth Circuit, the U.S. Department of Justice and
the U.S. Attorney intervened on the side of the schoolchildren. After he left office, Castillo returned
to Houston. In 1983, he wrote in a foreword to a special immigration issue of a law review:
[Tihe authors are all persons of recognized ability and concern .... [Among others,
Isaias Torres and Peter Schey] have all been involved in the daily battles of making the
INA [Immigration and Nationality Act] fit a particular individual's situation at a particu-
lar time.
During the time that I served as Commissioner (1977-[19]79), it was my privilege to
be sued ... by some of these individuals. I knew that regardless of the outcome, the ulti-
mate goal of justice for immigrants would prevail because effective advocates help cure
improper procedures and faulty legislation.
Leonel Castillo, Foreword, 5 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 191, 191 (1983).
73. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585-86, 590 (E.D. Tex 1978).
2013] 1173
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
dez case had sustained the statute fairly readily. 74 But Judge Justice over-
ruled the motion because the "amended complaint does not state a cause
of action against any school district other than the Tyler [ISD] and since
this court intends to order relief only against [the Tyler ISD]."
During the federal trial, the issue of Plyler's potential impact upon
other Texas school districts naturally arose, as word had spread to dozens
of other communities and sparked many companion lawsuits. The origi-
nal Hernandez decision had not spawned similar state court litigation;
MALDEF and others immediately turned to the federal courts so as to
avoid having to litigate over the long haul in multiple, hostile state ven-
ues before elected state judges. MALDEF now confronted questions
about how best to mesh its efforts, including its response to the Plyler
appeals filed by the Tyler ISD and the State of Texas, with proceedings
in other Texas venues. Some of the issues became clearer when the
state's largest school district, Houston ISD, faced a lawsuit in federal
court in September 1978, filed by a group of local attorneys and another
California-based public interest law firm, the Center for Immigrant
Rights, with civil rights lawyer (and South African immigrant) Peter
Schey as lead counsel. By this time, with the good news spreading from
the Tyler case, four cases raising these issues had been filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas and two in the northern
district. Moreover, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District that
had just decided Plyler faced six additional cases after the ruling. Rather
than just suing the particular ISDs, these suits included as defendants the
State of Texas, the Texas Governor, the Texas Education Agency (the
state agency that governed K-12 public education in the state), and its
Commissioner.76 Eventually, all these fresh cases were consolidated into
In re Alien Children Education Litigation7 7 and tried in the U.S. District
74. Interview with Peter Williamson, Hernandez Lawyer, in Houston, Tex. (Oct. 12, 2010).
75. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 552 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
76. See Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Certain Named & Unnamed
Noncitizen Children & Their Parents v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327 (1980); In re Alien Children, 501 F.
Supp. at 549 nn.3-5 (noting that Plyer became a veritable magnet, as various plaintiffs and defend-
ants were added, requiring many pages of explanation for these procedural issues, and included the
following cases: Martinez v. Reagen, C.A. No. H-78-1797 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 18, 1978), Car-
denas v. Meyer, C.A. No. H-78-1862 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 27, 1978), Garza v. Reagen, C.A. No. H-
78-2132 (S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 6, 1978), Mendoza v. Clark, C.A. No. H-78-1831 (S.D. Tex. filed
Sept. 22, 1978), Doe v. Wright, No. 3-79-0440-D (N.D. Tex. filed Apr. 1, 1979), Roe v. Holm, MO-
79-CA-49 (W.D. Tex. filed June 26, 1979), and Coe v. Holm, MO-78-CA-54 (W.D. Tex. filed July
5, 1979)); see also id. at 550 n.6 (describing "tag-along actions" originally filed in the Southern
District of Texas that were consolidated-including Cortes v. Wheeler, C.A. H-79-1926 (S.D. Tex.
filed Sept. 20, 1979), Rodrigues v. Meyer, C.A. H-79-1927 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 20, 1979), Adamo
v. Reagen, C.A. H-79-1928 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 20, 1979), and Arguelles v. Meyer, C.A. H-79-
2071 (S.D. Tex. filed Oct. 4, 1979)-as well as six additional cases originally filed in the Eastern
District of Texas that were likewise consolidated, including Doe v. Sulphur Springs, P-79-31 -CA
(E.D. Tex. filed Oct. 29, 1979), Doe v. Lodestro, B-79-618-CA (E.D. Tex. filed Sept. 18, 1979), Doe
v. Ford, TY-79-351-CA (E.D. Tex. filed Sept. 28, 1979), Roe v. Horn, TY-79-338-CA (E.D. Tex.
filed Sept. 24, 1979), Roe v. Como-Pickton, P-79-234-CA (E.D. Tex. filed Oct. 19, 1979), and Poe v.
Chappel Hill, TY-79-449-CA (E.D. Tex. filed Dec. 10, 1979)).
77. 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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Court for the Southern District of Texas in Houston before Judge Wood-
row Seals, who held a twenty-four-day trial.
These sprawling cases presented an even broader assault upon the
system, whereas Plyler had been narrowly focused on section 21.031 and
solely at the Tyler ISD. The various cases were brought by several dif-
ferent attorneys on many fronts, relying upon several theories, hoping
that they could replicate the victory Roos had carved out in his Tyler
case. At this point, it became crucial that the various parties coordinate
because the defendants had deep pockets, legions of deputy attorneys
general and private counsel, and other advantages, most importantly the
staying power to mow down the plaintiffs at the trial and appellate levels.
It was true that Roos had convinced the United States to intervene in his
case on the side of the alien schoolchildren, but over the long haul, the
federal government could not do so in every such case or be wholly re-
lied upon in civil rights cases, because its interests could change depend-
ing upon the Administration in office. 79 This scenario did occur in 1980-
1981, when California Governor Ronald Reagan defeated the incumbent
President Jimmy Carter and took office.
In May 1979, after Plyler was decided at the trial level but before In
re Alien Children was to go to trial, the local Houston counsel for the
plaintiffs in the case before Judge Seals wrote Peter Roos, requesting that
MALDEF consolidate its efforts into their case, which was more com-
plex and comprehensive than the original case against the Tyler ISD.
Roos responded to attorney Isaias Torres, a Texas native who had just
graduated from law school and was working for the non-governmental
organization (NGO) Houston Center for Immigrants, Inc., that MALDEF
felt "quite strongly that consolidation would not be in the best interests of
our mutual efforts."80 After all, MALDEF had carefully selected Tyler as
78. Observers of this trial have reported that Judge Woodrow Seals committed an interesting
gaffe during arguments when he asked "whether anything of worldwide importance had ever been
written in Spanish," or words to that effect. (Apparently he had not heard of the classic works by
Miguel Cervantes, Octavio Paz, Juan Vasconcellos, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Pablo Neruda, Sor
Juana, or the many other Latino or Latina writers.) Witnesses report that it was an electric moment,
one he sensed, and after which he publicly apologized. See Juan Ramon Palomo, Judge Seals Calls
Spanish Comment 'Senseless, Dreadful,' HOUS. POST, Mar. 7, 1980, at 4A.
79. A good example of this unreliability appeared in connection with a long-running dispute
involving public colleges in Nashville, Tennessee. The U.S. Department of Justice supported the
plaintiffs over the course of many years, and after working out the dispute among the many parties,
the judge entered a final order that included racially specific remedies. Later, after the Reagan Ad-
ministration took office, the U.S. Department of Justice attempted to switch horses and get the court
to strike down the agreement. The judge refused to accept this too-little-too-late intervention. Geier
v. Alexander, 801 F.2d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644 (M.D.
Tenn. 1977). The original case finally wound down on June 18, 2004, when the issue of attorney
fees was decided. Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 785-86 (6th Cir. 2004).
80. Letter from Peter Roos, Nat'l Dir. of Educ. Litig., MALDEF, to Isaias Torres, Lawyer,
Hous. Ctr. for Immigrants (May 17, 1979) (on file with Stanford University Cecil H. Green Library)
[hereinafter Letter from Roos to Torres]. In the interest of full disclosure, I note that Mr. Torres was
my Georgetown University Law Center classmate. I also note that I relied upon insider baseball
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the perfect federal venue for arguing its case: a progressive judge, sym-
pathetic clients, and a rural area where the media glare would not be as
great. In addition, in Tyler the case could be made that excluding the
small number of undocumented children (the practical effect of charging
$1,000 tuition to each) would actually lose money for the district, inas-
much as the state school funding formulae based allocation amounts up-
on overall head count attendance. Applying a hard lesson learned from
Rodriguez, MALDEF felt that in a large urban school district or a border
school district, the fact questions and statistical proofs would be more
complex and expensive to litigate for both sides. Moreover, because the
Tyler trial had been a case of first impression at the federal level, the
legal defense strategy had not been as sophisticated as it would be in
another similar trial. The earlier Hernandez case in Texas state court had
not involved the full panoply of legal and social science expertise and
financial support available to a national effort, such as that being mount-
ed by MALDEF with witnesses and research. The organization had taken
note in Rodriguez and Keyes that it must employ experts with uniquely
nuanced scholarship or risk making things worse. The Rodriguez school
finance litigation had not only precipitated a substantial amount of edu-
cational data, but its scholarly provenance and involvement by expensive
social scientists had upped the stakes for educational access litigation and
its attendant infrastructure of technical assistance, measurement and oth-
er evaluation data, and complex immigration expertise.81
Roos noted to Torres that the State had tried to make a late-in-the-
day correction for its ineffective original efforts by seeking the leave to
reopen the record, a request that Judge Justice had denied. State counsel
would not likely make that mistake again and would mount a more ag-
gressive strategy in their second go-around on appeal. Roos wrote:
"While no doubt you have been incrementally able to improve upon our
record [developed in the Tyler trial], consolidation would allow the state
and other parties to buttress their record. I believe that one could only
expect a narrowing of the present one-side[d]ness [of the trial record in
MALDEF's favor]. Consolidation would play right into th[e] hands of
[the State's attorney] Mr. Arnett."82
Torres, on the other hand, worried that unless the cases were consol-
idated, the relief in Plyler might not extend beyond that small district.
Tyler had folded, but what about Houston, Dallas, and the more im-
portant border districts? After all, Texas had over a thousand ISDs, and
conversations with Dr. Atigustina H. Reyes, who was a senior Houston ISD administrator and then a
member of the Houston ISD board as an elected official. I married her in 1984.
81. These were some of the problems that had doomed the educational finance case. See
generally Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation, Educational Finance, and Legal Impact:
An Empirical Analysis, 63 U. CINN. L. REV. 1735 passim (1995); Augustina H. Reyes, Does Money
Make a Difference for Hispanic Students in Urban Schools?, 35 EDUC. & URB. Soc'Y 363 passim
(2003).
82. Olivas, IMMIGRATION STORIES, supra note 39, at 206 (quoting Peter Roos).
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many of them had the same policies towards undocumented students as
had Tyler; it was a state statute that gave them such permission. To this
understandable concern, Roos indicated that his original strategy was
aimed at winning once and then applying it elsewhere later, not joining
up with other pending actions and thereby increasing the risk of losing on
appeal: "Most importantly, I believe that once we have a Tyler victory,
we will have started down a slippery slope which will make it impossible
for the court to legally or logistically limit the ruling to Tyler." This ap-
proach mirrors that of the NAACP on the road to Brown, where Thur-
good Marshall and his colleagues had carefully picked their fights, each
case incrementally building upon the previous litigation.8 1 Indeed,
MALDEF General Counsel Vilma Martinez had worked at the legal de-
fense fund with Marshall's former colleague and successor, Jack Green-
berg, and clearly understood the value of such an overarching strategic
vision and litigation plan.
But Roos had yet another reason for declining to join in the consoli-
dated cases: he felt he had drawn ineffective opposing local counsel and
wished to press his momentary advantage. He wrote, in a remarkable and
candid private assessment, "A final, but important reason for believing
consolidation unwise is, frankly, the quality of opposing counsel. Our
[local] opposing counsel in Tyler is frankly not very good."84 He went on
to say that this would likely not be the case in Houston, where the de-
fense would include experienced attorneys from the specialized educa-
tion law department of a major law firm and where other districts would
85also contribute their efforts and resources. He added, "I believe it is our
mutual interest to isolate the worst counsel to argue the case against us.
Consolidation works against that. For the above-stated reasons, I would
urge you not to seek consolidation. I just don't believe that it serves our
mutual interest of getting this statute knocked out."86
Although Roos did not agree to join forces with other litigants at the
crucial early stages, this issue was eventually taken out of his hands at
the U.S. Supreme Court. At the request of the State of Texas, the U.S.
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation eventually did consolidate a
number of the cases-but significantly, not Plyler-into the In re Alien
Children litigation, and notwithstanding Roos's doubts about whether the
Houston plaintiffs would succeed, Judge Seals rendered a favorable deci-
sion on the merits on July 21, 1980.87 The plaintiff schoolchildren pre-
vailed in a big way, most importantly on the issues of whether the State
83. See sources cited supra note 8.
84. Letter from Roos to Torres, supra note 80. This narrative derives from the various papers
in this extensive file, and my discussions with Attorney Roos.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 596-97 (S.D. Tex. 1980). His re-
marks about the Spanish language had occurred on the final day of the plaintiffs' testimony.
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of Texas could enact a statute to limit inducements to immigration and
whether equal protection applied to the undocumented in such an in-
stance. Judge Seals determined that Texas's concern for fiscal integrity
was not a compelling state interest and that charging tuition to the par-
ents or removing the children from school had not been shown to be nec-
essary to improve education within the state. Most importantly, he con-
cluded that section 21.031 had not been carefully tailored to advance the
state interest in a constitutional manner.
In the Fifth Circuit, meanwhile, Judge Justice's Plyler decision was
affirmed in October 1980, and in May 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court
agreed to hear the matter." The Fifth Circuit issued a summary affir-
mance of the consolidated Houston cases a few months later, and the
Supreme Court combined the Texas appeals of both cases under the styl-
ing of Plyler v. Doe, handing Peter Roos the lead vehicle over Peter
Schey's cases.89 Having developed fuller records and armed with Fifth
Circuit wins, the two organizations worked out a stiff and formal truce,
dividing the oral arguments down the middle but with MALDEF's case
leading the way. MALDEF had maneuvered itself into the first chair and
went to the Supreme Court with predominant control of the case, with
the newly established California-based NGO as its collaborator.
Roos spent the time until the Supreme Court arguments shoring up
political support and coordinating the many strands of such a complex
case, including the media strategy to humanize the children's plight. In
March 1979, he had written to Drew Days, the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Civil Rights, urging the government to join the litigation. Even-
tually, he persuaded the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Joseph A. Califano Jr., to write the Solicitor General urging him to enter
into the fray on the side of the children, whose side the government did
take. Other MALDEF letters went to state officials in California and
elsewhere, requesting and receiving their support. After the Reagan Ad-
ministration took office in January of 1981, Roos wrote William Clohan,
the incoming Under Secretary of the recently created Department of Ed-
ucation, to urge him to continue the actions of the Carter Administration.
Although the Reagan Administration did not formally enter its amicus
brief on the side of the plaintiffs (as had the Democrat lawyers) and took
no position on the crucial equal protection issue, fortunately for Roos, it
did not seek to overturn the lower court decisions. In fact, the brief
88. See Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1980); Certain Named & Unnamed Noncit-
izen Children & Their Parents v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327, 1327 (1980); see also Plyler v. Doe, 451
U.S. 968, 968 (1981) (noting probable jurisdiction in the Plyler litigation).
89. Texas v. Certain Named & Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children, 452 U.S. 937, 937
(1981) (noting probable jurisdiction in In re Alien Children). Again, it is good to be king, and first in
line. MALDEF retained formal control over this collaboration due to the styling and civil procedure
of the case, even as the two organizations were in sync now that their cases had been joined at the
Supreme Court level.
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stressed the primacy of the federal government in immigration, a position
that favored the schoolchildren. 90
In June 1982, the Supreme Court gave Roos and Schey their win on
all counts by a 5-4 margin. Justice Brennan, in his majority opinion
striking down the statute, characterized the Texas argument for charging
tuition as "nothing more than an assertion that illegal entry, without
more, prevents a person from becoming a resident for purposes of enrol-
ling his children in the public schools." 9' He employed an equal protec-
tion analysis to find that a state could not enact a discriminatory classifi-
cation "merely by defining a disfavored group as non-resident." 92 Justice
Brennan dismissed the State's first argument that the classification or
subclass of undocumented Mexican children was necessary to preserve
the state's "limited resources for the education of its lawful residents."93
This line of argumentation had been rejected in an earlier case, Graham
v. Richardson,94 where the Court had held that the concern for preserva-
tion of Arizona's resources alone could not justify an alienage classifica-
90. Although the Carter Administration officials had actually supported MALDEF and the
Houston children's attorneys in the earlier stages of the cases, including both the trial court and Fifth
Circuit phases, the Reagan Administration did not side with the appellee children when the cases
finally made their way to the Supreme Court, filing instead only as amicus curiae. Even more im-
portantly, the Administration did not file with the Texas side, and did not seek to become interve-
nors. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in No. 80-1538 and Brief for the United
States in No. 80-1934, Plyler v. Doe, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982) (Nos. 80-1538, 80-1934), 1981 WL
390001. As examples of the support MALDEF tried to line up for its side, the MALDEF files in-
clude numerous letters written by Roos. See, e.g., Letter from Peter Roos, Nat'l Dir. of Educ. Litig.,
MALDEF, to Peter Schilla, W. Ctr. on Law & Poverty, Sacramento, Cal. (May 19, 1981) (on file
with Stanford University Cecil H. Green Library); Letter from Peter Roos, Nat'l Dir. of Educ. Litig.,
MALDEF, to Peter Schilla (May 14, 1981) (on file with Stanford University Cecil H. Green Library,
M0673, Box 63, Folder 6); Letter from Peter Roos, Nat'l Dir. of Educ. Litig., MALDEF, to Norella
Beni Hall (May 14, 1981) (on file with Stanford University Cecil H. Green Library, M0673, Box 63,
Folder 6) (urging her support, but focusing upon education issue); Letter from Peter Roos, Nat'l Dir.
of Educ. Litig., MALDEF, to Lorenza Schmidt, Member, Cal. Bd. of Educ. (June 25, 1981) (on file
with Stanford University Cecil H. Green Library, M0673, Box 63, Folder 7); Letter from Peter Roos,
Nat'l Dir. of Educ. Litig., MALDEF, to Drew Days, Assoc. Attorney General (Mar. 28, 1979) (on
file with Stanford University Cecil H. Green Library, M0673, Box 61, Folder 8); Letter from Peter
Roos, Nat'l Dir. of Educ. Litig., MALDEF, to William Clohan, Under Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Educ.
(May 20, 1981) (on file with Stanford University Cecil H. Green Library, M0673, Box 63, Folder 6).
The files also include a letter from Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary Joseph A. Califano Jr.
to the U.S. Solicitor General Wade McCree, urging the United States to enter the case on behalf of
the children plaintiffs. Letter from Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, to Wade McRee, U.S. Solicitor General (July 17, 1979) (on file with Stanford University
Cecil H. Green Library, M0673, Box 907, Folder 9). These letters and dozens more show the extent
to which Roos and MALDEF sought and then shored up support for their clients. Veteran Supreme
Court observer Linda Greenhouse has carefully reviewed the notes and files from the case delibera-
tions, and captured the dynamics of the transitions between Department of Justice administrations,
which likely accounted for the unusual silence. See Linda Greenhouse, What Would Justice Powell
Do? The 'Alien Children' Case and the Meaning ofEqual Protection, 25 CONsT. COMMENT. 29, 30-
33 (2008). Noting the inconsistencies, she characterized it this way: "The brief the Solicitor General
filed was an extremely odd, even tortured, document." Id. at 31 n. 10. At the end of the day, and at
the margins, this ambivalence likely worked to the advantage of the children's case. See id.
91. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 n.22 (1982).
92. Id. at 227.
93. Id. (quoting Brief for the Appellants at 26, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Nos. 80-
1538, 80-1934), 1981 WL 389967, at *26) (internal quotation mark omitted).
94. 403 U.S. 365, 370-71 (1971).
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tion used in allocating welfare benefits.95 In addition, he relied on the
findings of fact from the Plyler trial: although the exclusion of all undoc-
umented children might eventually result in some small savings to the
state, those savings would be uncertain (given that federal and state allo-
cations depended primarily upon the number of children enrolled),96 and
barring those children would "not necessarily improve the quality of ed-
ucation."97
The State also argued that it had enacted the legislation to protect it-
self from an influx of undocumented aliens.98 The Court acknowledged
the concern but found that the statute was not tailored to address it:
"[C]harging tuition to undocumented children constitutes a ludicrously
ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immigration."99 The Court
also noted that immigration and naturalization policy is within the exclu-
sive powers of federal government, although it did not rest upon preemp-
tion.100 Finally, the State maintained that it singled out undocumented
children because their unlawful presence rendered them less likely to
remain in the United States and to use the free public education they re-
ceived in order to contribute to the social and political goals of the U.S.
community.10 Justice Brennan distinguished the subclass of undocu-
mented aliens who had lived in the United States as a family, for all prac-
tical purposes, permanently from the subclass of adult aliens who had
entered the country alone to earn money temporarily.1 02 For those who
remained with the intent of making the United States their home, "[i]t is
difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by pro-
moting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within
our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemploy-
,,103ment, welfare, and crime.
Prior to Plyer, the Supreme Court had never taken up the question
of whether undocumented aliens could seek Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection.'" The Court had long held that aliens are "persons" for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment 05 and that undocumented aliens
are protected by the due process provisions of the Fifth Amendment. 06
95. Id. at 374-76.
96. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 576-77 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
97. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229.
98. Id. at 227-29.
99. Id. at 228 (quoting Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 585) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 225-26.
101. Id. at 230.
102. Id
103. Id
104. "No State shall . . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
105. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("[The Fourteenth Amendment provi-
sions] are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality . . . .").
106. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
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However, Texas argued that because undocumented children were not
"within its jurisdiction," they were not entitled to equal protection.107
Justice Brennan rejected this line of reasoning, concluding that there "is
simply no support for [the] suggestion that 'due process' is somehow of
greater stature than 'equal protection' and therefore available to a larger
class of persons." 08
After the Rodriguez school finance decision, Justice Brennan had to
walk a fine line to apply what amounted to scrutiny more demanding
than the usual rational basis review. Although he rejected treating un-
documented alienage as a suspect classification, 09 he concluded that the
children were not responsible for their own citizenship status and that
treating them as the Texas school finance law envisioned would "not
comport with fundamental conceptions of justice." 0 He was more em-
phatically concerned with education, however, carefully elaborating the
nature of the entitlement to it. He wrote carefully and reaffirmed the ear-
lier Rodriguez holding that public education was not a fundamental right
(undoubtedly to attract the vote of Justice Powell, the author of the Ro-
driguez majority opinion), and recited a litany of cases holding education
to occupy "a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our socie-
ty.'," 1 He also noted that "[i]lliteracy is an enduring disability," one that
would plague the individual and society.'1 2 These observations enabled
him to establish "the proper level of deference to be afforded § 21.031."
He concluded, in light of the significant ongoing costs, that the measure
"can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial
goal of the State"-subtle and nuanced phrasing that nudged the level of
scrutiny to what would be characterized as intermediate scrutiny." 3 Chief
Justice Burger's dissent, in contrast, stuck with the customary formula-
tion, requiring only "a rational relationship to a legitimate state pur-
pose."l14 As a result of Justice Brennan's careful construction, the Court
rejected the claim, which the dissent found persuasive, that the policy
was sufficiently related to protecting the State's asserted interests.
Further, while the Court did not reach the claim of federal preemp-
tion,' it did draw a crucial distinction between what states and the fed-
107. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 211.
108. Id. at 213.
109. Id. at 219 n.19.
110. Id. at 219-20 (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977), an important case
applying greater scrutiny to classifications disadvantaging children bom to unmarried parents).
111. Id. at 221.
112. Id.at222.
113. Id.at223-24.
114. Id. at 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In the dissent, Chief Justice Burger concurred that the
Equal Protection Clause applies to undocumented aliens. Id. at 243.
115. Id. at 210 n.8 (majority opinion). In a post-secondary education residency alienage case
decided soon after Plyler, Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982), the decision turned on preemption. See
Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, Toll v. Moreno, and Postsecondary Admissions: Undocumented
Adults and 'Enduring Disability,' 15 J.L. & EDUC. 19,29-30 (1986).
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eral government may do in legislating treatment of aliens."'6 The Court
had upheld state statutes restricting alien employment' 17 and access to
welfare benefits," 8 largely because those state measures mirrored federal
classifications and congressional action governing immigration. For ex-
ample, in De Canas v. Bica,1l9 the Supreme Court held that a state statute
punishing employers for hiring aliens not authorized to work in the Unit-
ed States was not fully preempted by federal immigration law. 2 0 In pub-
lic education, however, Brennan wrote, distinguishing De Canas, "[W]e
perceive no national policy that supports the State in denying these chil-
dren an elementary education."' 2 1 As was seen, Justice Brennan's majori-
ty opinion did not rely upon the preemption doctrine, finding that the
Texas legislation foundered even upon lesser shoals, those of equal pro-
tection, stretching the children's status and their innocence to find the
State's reasoning to be "ludicrously ineffectual." 2 2
Although Plyler's incontestably bold reasoning has not substantially
influenced subsequent Supreme Court immigration jurisprudence in the
thirty years since it was decided, the educational significance of the case
is still clear, even if it is limited to this small subset of schoolchildren-
largely Latinos-in the United States. Given the poor overall educational
achievement evident in this population, even this one success story has
significance. Again, the parallel to Brown is striking: Brown's legacy is
questioned even after almost sixty years, largely due to Anglo racial in-
transigence and the failure of integration's promise.123
That September 1982, the Court denied Texas's petitions to rehear
the case, and the matter was over.124 More than five years had passed
since the issue had first appeared on the MALDEF radar screen, and the
extraordinary skills and disciplined legal strategy of Roos and Martinez
prevailed. Indeed, their overarching strategic vision enabled them to
avoid the many centripetal political forces that threatened Plyler at every
turn. To be sure, luck and the grace of God appeared to have intervened
at all the key times: sympathetic clients with a straightforward story to
tell, confronting an unpopular state statute that never had its own com-
116. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224-26.
117. Id at 225 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 361 (1976)).
118. Id at 225 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)).
119. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
120. Id. at 356.
121. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225-26. This sentence became the focus of efforts to change federal
law in 1996, led by California Republican Representative Elton Gallegly, to incorporate an explicit
provision authorizing exclusion of undocumented children from public schools. See Gallegly on
School Funding, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1995, at 4.
122. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 (E.D. Tex. 1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
123. For critiques of Brown, see generally DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM passim (2004); WHAT
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS
REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION passim (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2002).
124. Plyler v. Doe, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
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pelling story; flying under big-city legal radar and lucking into poor op-
posing local counsel; federal and state officials at the critical early stages
who were sympathetic and helpful; a change in the national Administra-
tion that did not result in formal opposition; the ability to keep the Tyler
case on track and for the Houston-based cases to prevail at their own
speed and upon their own legs; and the right array of judges hearing the
cases as they wended their way through the system. This issue could
have foundered at any one of the many turns, winding up like Rodriguez,
with a similar gravitational pull but a more complex statistical calculus
and worse luck or, like Keyes, with active opposition from the plaintiffs'
original purposive lawyers.125 But the considerable legal and political
skills of the MALDEF lawyers and the other lawyers served the school-
125. By this time, MALDEF lawyers had also argued many desegregation cases, including
ones where the LDF had brought the original case, leading to the unresolved question-Why didn't
these groups collaborate at the beginning of the cases and bring them together, rather than undermine
each other's hopes with fundamentally different strategies? There may be no perfect solution for
such a competitive situation and two important purposive organizations, but the competition heated
up substantially during this period, as MALDEF was moving to the forefront with its own litigation
strategies. One way to divide the cases might have been a more carefully coordinated regional strat-
egy, for example, allowing MALDEF to pursue the de facto cases, leaving the LDF to pursue dejure
cases. In the portfolio of cases, particularly the desegregation litigation brought by MALDEF over
the years, a small number of them have been ongoing and not completely closed for over four dec-
ades. For example, in May 1974, MALDEF had intervened in another LDF case brought to desegre-
gate a Southwestern school district, this one in Tucson, a case that has continued through 2013. In
1974, the NAACP sued Tucson Unified School District No. I on behalf of African American stu-
dents, charging the district with segregating and otherwise discriminating against its African Ameri-
can students. Fisher v. Lohr, No. CIV 74-90-TUC-WCF (D. Ariz. Mar. 5, 1996). In October 1974,
MALDEF filed a later-consolidated lawsuit containing similar allegations on behalf of Mexican
American students. Mendoza v. Tucson Sch. Dist. No. 1, 623 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied sub nom. Sanchez v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Mendoza v.
Tucson Unified School District, MALDEF.ORG,
http://www.maldef.org/education/litigation/mendoza v-tucson-unified/ (last visited May 22, 2013).
In 1976, the United States intervened. The case was tried by the district court in January 1977, and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on June 4, 1978. The parties subsequently
reached a settlement, including a comprehensive desegregation plan that was filed with the trial
court, on August I1, 1978. The Stipulation of Settlement was approved by the court by order dated
August 31, 1978. More than twenty-five years later, on January 18, 2005, the school district filed a
Petition for Unitary Status, which the court granted in April 2008, terminating court oversight pend-
ing acceptance of a Post-Proposed Desegregation/Unitary Status Plan (PUSP) "fashioned by a joint
committee of the parties and experts." Fisher v. Lohr, Nos. CV 74-90 TUC DCB, CV 74-204 TUC
DCB, 2011 WL 4102233, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 14, 2011) On December 18, 2009, the court approved
the PUSP and ended federal judicial oversight of the district. The plaintiffs appealed, and on July 19,
2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's decision,
ordering continued jurisdiction by the district court until the Tucson school district has met its bur-
den to achieve unitary status. See Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131, 1143-45 (9th
Cir. 2011). On September 14, 2011, the district court ordered the appointment of a Special Master to
develop a Proposed Desegregation/Unitary Status Plan (the Plan) for the district. Fisher, 2011 WL
4102233, at *3. On January 6, 2012, the Special Master was appointed and directed to work with the
parties on a plan containing "[s]pecific substantive programs and provisions to be implemented by
the [Tucson Unified School District] to address all outstanding Green factors and all other ancillary
factors." Fisher v. Lohr, Nos. I10-15124, 10-15375, 10-15407, at 5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 6, 2012) (granting
Order Appointing Special Master). "Because [the Plan] is intended by the Parties [to serve as] a
consent order, it shall be referred to interchangeably as a Plan and an Order." Id Public comment
extended through late November 2012. Notice of Proposed Desegregation/Unitary Status Plan and
Public Opportunity for Comment, MALDEF.ORG,
http://www.maldef.org/assets/pdf/12_11_09_PublicNoticeEN.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
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children well, as they had the earlier minority lawyers and Anglo lawyers
on the path to Brown.
Soon after Plyler, both Vilma Martinez and Peter Roos left
MALDEF-she to a Los Angeles law firm and he to the San Francisco-
based public interest organization, META, Inc. (Multicultural Education,
Training and Advocacy), where he continued education litigation on bi-
lingual rights and immigrant rights.126 In 2009, Martinez became Presi-
dent Barack Obama's Ambassador to Argentina. 127  The original
MALDEF San Antonio lawyer who had written the first Plyler memo,
Joaquin Avila, succeeded Martinez as MALDEF's president and general
counsel. In 1996, he won a MacArthur Foundation "genius" fellowship
after several years in private practice concentrating on voting rights; he
now is a law teacher at Seattle University School of Law. Whatever be-
came of the undocumented schoolchildren from Tyler, Texas? According
to a newspaper story following up on them a dozen years later, nearly all
of them graduated and through various immigration provisions, obtained
permission to stay in the United States and regularize their status. 28In
2007, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the case, a number of reporters
covered their lives for follow-up stories, and more have since ap-
peared.12 9 In June 2012, the thirtieth anniversary, President Obama an-
nounced his Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative,
addressing the issue of undocumented college students, hundreds of
126. See Biography: Vilma Martinez, U.S. DEP'T ST.,
http://www.state.gov/r/palei/biog/129351.htm (last visited May 22, 2013); Roger L. Rice, Multicul-
tural Education, Training, and Advocacy (META), SAGE KNOWLEDGE,
http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/bilingual/n212.xml (last visited May 22, 2013).
127. See Biography of Vilma Martinez, U.S. DEP'T ST.,
http://www.state.gov/r/palei/biog/129351.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
128. See Paul Feldman, Texas Case Looms over Prop. 187's Legal Future Justice: U.S. High
Court Voided that State's '75 Law on Illegal Immigrants, but Panel Has Since Shifted to the Right,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1994, at 1. For more information on the education of undocumented children
post-Plyler, see generally Jorge Chapa, A Demographic and Sociological Perspective on Plyler 's
Children, 1980-2005, 3 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 186 (2008); Roberto G. Gonzales, Left Out but Not
Shut Down: Political Activism and the Undocumented Student Movement, 3 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y
219 (2008); Aarti Kohli, Educating Undocumented Students: The Legacy of Plyler v. Doe, 3 Nw.
J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 185 (2008); and John Rogers et al., Civic Lessons: Public Schools and the Civic
Development of Undocumented Students and Parents, 3 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 201 (2008).
129. The twenty-fifth anniversary of the case occasioned several follow-up articles interview-
ing participants. See, e.g., Barbara Belejack, A Lesson in Equal Protection: The Texas Cases that
Opened the Schoolhouse Door to Undocumented Immigrant Children, TEX. OBSERVER (Austin,
Tex.), July 13, 2007, at 14; Lucy Hood, Educating Immigrant Students, CARNEGIE REP., Spring
2007, at 2, 2-8 (interviewing Judge William W. Justice regarding Plyler); Unmuth, supra note 70;
Mary Ann Zehr, Case Touched Many Parts of Community, EDUC. WK., June 6, 2007, at 13. A spe-
cial Plyler issue of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy included several articles on
the case and its aftermath. See e.g., Jorge Chapa, A Demographic and Sociological Perspective on
Plyler's Children, 1980-2005, 3 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 186 passim (2008); Roberto G. Gonzales,
Left Out but Not Shut Down: Political Activism and the Undocumented Student Movement, 3 Nw.
J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 219 passim (2008); Aarti Kohli, Educating Undocumented Students: The Legacy
of Plyler v. Doe, Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 185 passim (2008); John Rogers et al., Civic Lessons:
Public Schools and the Civic Development of Undocumented Students and Parents, 3 Nw. J.L. &
SOC. POL'Y 201 passim (2008).
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thousands of whom attend college only because of the pathway cleared
for them by the Plyler holding.130
The year after Plyler was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court took up
a related case, Martinez v. Bynum,'31 and upheld a different part of sec-
tion 21.031, which provided that the parents or guardians of citizen and
undocumented children had to reside in a school district before they
could send their children to free public schools.' 32 Although this was the
element of the statute that first drew Avila's attention and started the ball
rolling towards MALDEF's filing of the Plyler lawsuit, the holding of
Martinez does not amount to a significant narrowing of Plyler, where the
parents actually resided in the school districts, albeit in unauthorized
immigration status. The student in Martinez was the U.S. citizen child of
undocumented parents who had returned to Mexico after his birth and
left him in the care of his adult sister who was not his legal guardian; the
Court sustained Texas's determination that the child did not "reside" in
the district and thus did not qualify for free public schooling there, ruling
that Plyler did not bar application of appropriately defined bona fide
residence tests.'3 3 The Plyler Court indicated in passing that the undocu-
mented may establish domicile in the country, a much larger issue than
the issue presented in Martinez, where the child's parents had not estab-
lished the requisite residence in the district. Justice Brennan noted, "A
State may not ... accomplish what would otherwise be prohibited by the
Equal Protection Clause, merely by defining a disfavored group as non-
resident. And illegal entry into the country would not, under traditional
criteria, bar a person from obtaining domicile within a State."' 3 4
In 1994, an unpopular Governor of California, Pete Wilson, revived
his reelection campaign by backing a state ballot initiative known as
Proposition 187, which would have denied virtually all state-funded ben-
efits, including public education, to undocumented aliens. Proposition
187 passed with nearly 60% of the vote and Wilson was reelected, but
the federal courts enjoined implementation of most of the ballot measure,
relying prominently on Plyler.135 During the congressional debates that
eventually led to the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
130. See Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and
the Vexing Case(s) ofDREAMAct Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 463, 537-38, 542 (2012)
[hereinafter Olivas, Dreams Deferred]; Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM
Act and the Legislative Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L.
REV. 1757 (2009) [hereinafter Olivas, The Political Economy]; Miriam Jordan, Anatomy ofa De-
ferred-Action Dream, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2012, at A2; Julia Preston, Young Immigrants Say It's
Obama's Time to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2012, at Al.
131. 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
132. Id at 333.
133. Id. at 323-24, 327-29.
134. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 n.22 (1982).
135. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1261 (C.D. Cal.
1997); see also VANESSA A. BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: HOw JUSTICES AND




Inimigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, California Republican Repre-
sentative Elton Gallegly proposed an amendment that would have al-
lowed states to charge tuition to undocumented students or exclude them
from public schools. He was banking that in the wake of such federal
legislation, the courts would distinguish Plyler and sustain the state
measure. The provision became quite politicized, receiving prominent
support from Republican presidential candidate Robert Dole.136 Gallegly
might have been right that the Constitution would not be read by the
Court of the 1990s to nullify a federal enactment of the kind he proposed,
but he never got a chance to find out because Plyler proved to have con-
siderable strength in the political arena. The Gallegly amendment drew
heated opposition in Congress and in the media, and critics relied heavily
on the values and arguments highlighted in Plyler-and often on the
decision itself.13 7 After months of contentious debate, the amendment
was dropped from the final legislation, and no provisions became law
that restricted alien children's right to attend school.138 Plyler and the
polity appear to have settled the question, although bills have been intro-
duced in Congress and even in states over the years to deny birthright
citizenship to children born in the United States. 3 9
Although Plyler had addressed the issue of public schoolchildren in
the K-12 setting, almost immediately after the ruling, questions arose
about how far the decision could be extended, notably whether it would
protect undocumented college students. Before long, Peter Roos was
going for the long ball again, litigating post-secondary Plyler cases in
California and elsewhere.14 0 The ultimate irony is that in 2001, just after
136. See Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Republican Party Platform of 1996, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 12, 1996), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=25848
(announcing Republican Party stance on illegal immigration and reform for the 1996 presidential
election); Where Bob Dole Stands on Immigration, 4PRESIDENT.ORG,
http://www.dolekemp96.org/agendalissues/immigration.htm (last visited May 21, 2013) (highlight-
ing Robert Dole's support of immigration reform during his 1996 bid for presidency); see also
THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY
1354-1419 (2008); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1140-1247 (2009); Rebecca A. Maynard & Daniel J. McGrath, Family
Structure, Fertility and Child Welfare, in THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF EDUCATION 125, 125 (Jere R.
Behrman & Nevzer Stacey eds., 1997); Clinton Vows Veto ofImmigration Bill if Gallegly Amend-
ment Is Included, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES I 11 passim (1996); Education Bar Dispute Again
Stalls Immigration Bill, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1255 passim (1996); Eleventh-Hour Agreement
Folds Immigration Bill Into Omnibus Spending Measure, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1281 passim
(1996); Immigration Legislation Moving Again, Conference, Floor Action Imminent, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1209 passim (1996).
137. Representative Gallegly has continued his campaign, such as the bill he introduced on
January 6, 2009. H.R. 126, 111th Cong. (2009).
138. See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION LAW 137-42
(2009); Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection ofImmigration Status,
Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1565 n.264 (1995).
139. See Joshua Zingher, Get on the Omnibus: Immigration Reform and the Electoral Motiva-
tions of State Legislators (Apr. 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Denver Universi-
ty Law Review).
140. Roos later litigated such cases as Leticia "A " v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cal., No.
588982-5 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. May 30, 1985). See Peter D. Roos, Postsecondary Plyler 12-
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Governor George Bush left Texas to become President George Bush, the
state enacted House Bill 1403, establishing the right of undocumented
college students to establish resident status and pay in-state tuition in the
state's public colleges.141 Governor Rick Perry, who signed the legisla-
tion into law, paid dearly for his actions in the 2012 GOP primary, where
all his opponents took him to task.14 2 In those years since Texas had en-
acted section 21.031, this was silent testimony to the idea that you reside
where you live, quite apart from your immigration status.
Over a dozen states have acted since the Texas innovation.14 3 And
in Congress, the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors
(DREAM) Act has been considered in Congress and voted on more than
once, but has remained elusive to date. If enacted, it would remove a
provision from federal law that addresses the issue of states providing in-
state tuition status to undocumented college students and would allow the
students the opportunity to regularize their federal immigration status-
an enormous benefit that would go well beyond what a state could pro-
vide. And in 2012, DACA emerged for administrative relief, if not re-
form.'" Plyler clearly is alive and well in its adolescence. And
MALDEF has cemented its reputation as the major purposive player in
immigration litigation.
III. REFLECTIONS ON A STRATEGIC LITIGATION DOCKET
As has been noted, organized groups whose raison d'dtre is to ad-
vocate for a given position, purpose, interest, or perspective are deemed
by political scientists to be "purposive groups," with long- and short-
term ideological goals and organizational structures that allow them to
best advance their goals in the polity, legislatures, and courts.145 These
groups' purposiveness emerges as they focus on specific organizational
13 (Inst. for Higher Educ. Law & Governance, Monograph No. 91-7, 1991), available at
http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/monographl91 -7.pdf. He was also involved as amicus defending the
state statutes in Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007), and Martinez v. Bd of Regents, 241
P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010). Brief of Intervenors-Defendants/Appellees Hispanic American Leadership
Organization & the Kansas League of United Latin American Citizens, Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127
(10th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-3309), 2005 WL 6045905; Application to File Brief Arnicus Curiae, and
Brief Amicus Curiae of Californians Together, the Ass'n of Mexican American Educators, & the
California Ass'n of Bilingual Education, Martinez v. Bd. of Regents, 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010) (No.
S167791), 2009 WL 2510799.
141. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.052 (2012); see also Clay Robison, Budget Hits Include
Judges' Pay Hike, HOUSTON CHRON., June 18, 2001, at Al (describing tuition and revenue bill
details). For insomniacs in the reading public, see generally Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone
Wild? College Residency and the Response to Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99 (2008) (react-
ing to the work of Kris W. Kobach, Immigration Nullification: In-State Tuition and Lawmakers Who
Disregard the Law, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 473 (2007)).
142. Trip Gabriel, Stance on Immigration May Hurt Perry Early On, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2011, at A12.
143. Olivas, The Political Economy, supra note 130, at 1764; see also JOHNSON ET AL., supra
note 138, at 144-49.
144. See Olivas, Dreams Deferred, supra note 130, at 537; Julia Preston, More Young Illegal
Immigrants Apply for, and Receive, Reprieves, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A14.
145. BAIRD, supra note 135, at 49.
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goals and enact defined strategies for gathering resources and making
their point of view known, heard, and accommodated. For example, in a
detailed study of church-state separation cases, purposive groups were
involved in nearly every case that reached the Supreme Court (and lower
appellate courts) between 1951 and 1971, a trend that became even more
evident in the period between 1971 and 1974.146 A similar study of the
many obscenity cases brought between 1957 and 1982 showed the same
deep group structure.14 7 The organizational formats are as varied as there
are such groups, and they can be very large membership service orgam-
zations, such as the National Rifle Association or American Association
of Retired Persons, or more focused ideological groupings with defined
purposive points of origin, such as MALDEF, the NAACP Legal De-
fense Fund, or the Alliance Defense Fund. 14 8 Today's American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) may be the quintessential purposive organiza-
tion, national in scope with decentralized governance and a broad atten-
tion span. The groups can take the shape of profit making, nonprofit,
church-related, or professional organizations, and many undertake no
litigation as their mode of operation but identify and search out legal
issues to fan the flames. But those groups that do litigate as their mission
organize in order to bring suits or file amicus briefs, and many of these
groups will do both by monitoring the various dockets where their cases
arise and by engaging in signaling activities to make their preferences
heard in the din surrounding any case. Supreme Court scholar Vanessa
Baird has noted:
Because of the various goals and actors who participate in litigation,
it is difficult to devise a theory for whether these different goals af-
fect the relationship between the Supreme Court's policy priorities
and its resulting agenda. The only plausible prediction that remains
consistent across different kinds of groups with different goals is that
previous decisions create a reason to test new legal arguments. Previ-
ous decisions can close issues, which may lead to the opening of oth-
ers or create uncertainty about how far the Court is likely to go.
Groups that lose at the Supreme Court have reason to support future
litigation to contain that loss, and groups whose interests are favored
by the Court have an interest in pushing the envelope further. The
146. See generally FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS OF CHURCH AND STATE passim (1976) (explaining the most important Supreme Court
cases in First Amendment doctrine and the various political groups frequently associated with this
area of law).
147. See Joseph F. Kobylka, A Court-Created Context for Group Litigation: Libertarian
Groups and Obscenity, 49 J. POL. 1061 passim (1987) (studying sixty-nine U.S. Supreme Court
cases brought by "libertarian" and "proscriptionist" groups).
148. See MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, SUING ALMA MATER: HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE COURTS
passim (2013) (studying the Alliance Defense Fund bringing college law cases). In the fall of 2012,
the Alliance Defense Fund changed its name to Alliance Defending Freedom. Alliance Defense
Fund Is Now Alliance Defending Freedom, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM,
http://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/page/new-name?referral=10712RB (last visited Apr. 24,
2013).
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combined end result of all of these activities is that there are more
well-framed cases in a particular policy area on the Court's agenda in
the years that follow the decisions that indicate their priorities. 149
In the first half of the twentieth century, most of the major litigation
brought by or on behalf of Mexican American plaintiffs in the general
areas of civil rights-particularly education, voting rights, equal em-
ployment opportunity, immigration, and other antidiscrimination do-
mains-was not brought by organized purposive organizations with sub-
stantive legal capacities or even by Mexican American lawyers. But the
few Mexican American lawyers who did practice worked with a variety
of other lawyers and were actively engaged in resisting the discriminato-
ry practices visited upon the community. As I have reflected else-
where,so given the clearly documented and lamentable educational
achievement of Mexican Americans in the twenty-first century and the
longstanding roots of this phenomenon, this long history of resistance,
reaching back nearly a century, will likely come as a surprise to many
observers. But the trails have been marked and recorded by many schol-
ars, including Richard R. Valencia, in his Chicano Students and the
Courts: The Mexican American Legal Struggle for Educational Equali-
ty.1' In a revealing table listing Mexican American school desegregation
cases, he counts thirty-five such cases between 1925 and 1985, beginning
with Romo v. Laird,152 in which a Mexican American family sought the
right for their four children to attend a comprehensive "white" school in
Tempe, Arizona, rather than the "Spanish-Mexican" school these chil-
dren were assigned, which served as the laboratory school for the nearby
Tempe State Teachers' College (later Arizona State University).153 While
the Romo family won this battle for a single school term, it lost the war
because the school officials began to assign Mexican-origin children
exclusively to "Mexican schools" on the asserted pedagogical assump-
tion that Spanish-speaking children would only learn when instructed in
Spanish. This was a widely employed means of segregating Mexican
American children-even those who were English speakers-to aver that
their linguistic needs were best met by separating them, despite the
flawed premise and segregative effect that this instructional choice had
upon the children. Valencia labeled this tactic a "practice, used over and
over, [that] was, at its core, racialized segregation"'154 This theme ran
149. BAIRD, supra note 135, at 50-51.
150. Michael A. Olivas, The Arc of Triumph and the Agony of Defeat: Mexican Americans and
the Law, 60 J. LEG. EDUC. 354, 357-62, 365-66 (2010).
151. vALENCIA, supra note 63, at 8.
152. Findings of Fact and Order, Romo v. Laird, No. 21617 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. 1925),
reprinted in Laura K. Mufioz, Separate but Equal? A Case Study of Romo v. Laird and Mexican
American Schooling, 15 OAH MAG. HIST. 28, 131-32 (2001).
153. Id.
154. VALENCIA, supra note 63, at 15.
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through Keyes, and it was not new to litigation by and on behalf of Chi-
canos.
Ignoring the children's actual language ability was a practice often
used with the other common but unsubstantiated ascription that migrant
worker children required separate schools so that their sojourner farm
labors would not disrupt the flow of instruction. School districts failed to
assess the language capacity of the children or to account for the small
number of children actually involved in migratory labor. This reasoning
was particularly widespread in Texas, such as in Independent School
District v. Salvatierra,156 a 1930 case set in Del Rio, Texas. As legal
scholar George A. Martinez has noted of the case, which he situates as
the first Mexican American desegregation case:
This case is highly significant because it provided two justifica-
tions for segregating Mexican-American children. Specifically, the
district could segregate children because of linguistic difficulties or
because they were migrant farm workers. This case also presents us
with another example of legal indeterminacy. The Salvatierra court
acknowledged that no other Texas court had yet addressed the legali-
ty of segregating Mexican-Americans from other white races. Given
this vacuum, the court's decision disallowing race-based segregation
for Mexican-Americans was not compelled. The court could have
followed other jurisdictions that allowed school boards to segregate
children on the basis of race, even without statutory authorization.
Similarly, the court's conclusion that Mexican-Americans could be
segregated for "benign reasons" was not logically compelled. Be-
cause only Mexican-Americans were segregated for linguistic diffi-
culties and migrant farm-working patterns, the court might have
found that, in effect, such segregation was race-based and therefore
illegal. Alternatively, the court might have followed the reasoning of
courts in other jurisdictions which had held that, in the absence of
155. Legal scholar George Martinez has written a detailed chronology of Chicano litigation in
several arenas, including education. See generally George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judi-
cial Discretion and the Mexican-American Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 555, 574-611 (1994). He also reviewed the effect of Keyes upon subsequent cases. Id. at 585-
611; see also Rangel & Alcala, supra note 18, at 319-69; see generally Brian D. Behnken, Elusive
Unity: African Americans, Mexican Americans, and Civil Rights in Houston, in SEEKING
INALIENABLE RIGHTS: TEXANS AND THEIR QUESTS FOR JUSTICE 123-45 (Debra A. Reid ed., 2009)
[hereinafter SEEKING INALIENABLE RIGHTS] (discussing the legal struggles of Mexican Americans,
the groups used to organize communities, and the cases that removed barriers to education); Lisa Y.
Ramos, Not Similar Enough: Mexican American and African American Civil Rights Struggles in the
1940s, in THE STRUGGLE IN BLACK AND BROWN: AFRICAN AMERICAN AND MEXICAN AMERICAN
RELATIONS DURING THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 19-38 (Brian D. Behnken ed., 2011); Steven H. Wilson,
Chicanismo and the Flexible 14th Amendment: 1960s Agitation and Litigation by Mexican American
Youth in Texas, in SEEKING INALIENABLE RIGHTS, supra, at 147-68.
156. 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 580 (1931). Interestingly,
this case was tried by a small group of lawyers, including the first two Mexican American lawyers
licensed in Texas, J.T. Canales and M.C. Gonzales, and the third such lawyer, Alonso S. Perales,
who collaborated upon the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. This was the only case that the three of
them ever tried together. See Michael A. Olivas, The Legal Career of Alonso S. Perales, in "IN
DEFENSE OF MY PEOPLE": ALONSO S. PERALES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICAN-AMERICAN
PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS 315, 318 (Michael A. Olivas ed., 2012).
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express legislation, segregation was illegal. As no legislation express-
ly authorized the specific segregation at issue in Salvatierra, the
court could have held that segregation-even for linguistic or mi-
grant farm worker reasons-was illegal.
Moreover, the court allowed the segregation to stand despite clear
evidence that the district practiced arbitrary segregation. For exam-
ple, white children who started school late were not placed in the
Mexican school. Thus, the school board's assertion that it segregated
children in the Mexican school because they started school late was a
mere pretext. In addition, there were no tests demonstrating that the
Mexican-American children were less proficient in English, the other
alleged justification for the segregation. In any event, the court did
not consider the possibility that bilingual education might address
any language problems better than segregation. 157.
During the early 1930s, when there were very few Mexican Ameri-
can scholars, George I. Sanchez had already taken aim at the misuse of
psychometric instruments and the failure to assess the linguistic charac-
teristics of Spanish-speaking children.'58 Similarly, Texas writer Jovita
Gonzalez had begun her careful folklore studies. 159 Valencia comprehen-
sively reviews these efforts at litigation and scholarship, both with an
overarching theoretical section and through single chapters on the vari-
ous subjects of educational litigation, including school segregation,
school financing, special education, bilingual education, undocumented
students, higher education financing, and high-stakes testing. His novel
contribution is his synthetic treatment of the elements of Mexican Amer-
ican activism that have historically fed the struggle for educational op-
portunity:
[A]dvocacy organizations, individual activists, political demonstra-
tions, legislation, and the subject of this book-litigation. In order for
the Mexican American people to optimize their campaign for equali-
ty in education, they must draw from all five forms of struggle. Each
one in itself is important, but all five streams flowing simultaneously
and eventually becoming one fast-moving river have the potential to
create a powerful confluence for systemic change in education.160
One of the important cases Valencia discusses is Delgado v.
Bastrop Independent School District,161 a federal district court opinion
from June 1948, which struck down the segregative practices in this cen-
157. Martinez, supra note 155, at 575 (footnotes omitted).
158. See, e.g., George 1. Sinchez, Group Differences and Spanish-Speaking Children-A
Critical Review, 16 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 549 passim (1932); George 1. SAnchez, Bilingualism and
Mental Measures: A Word ofCaution, 18 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 765 passim (1934).
159. See, e.g., Jose E. Lim6n, Folklore, Gendered Repression, and Cultural Critique. The Case
ofJovita Gonzalez, 35 TEX. STUD. LIT. & LANG. 453, 453-54 (1993).
160. VALENCIA, supra note 63, at 319.
161. Civ. No. 388 (W.D. Tex. June 15, 1948).
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tral Texas community of Bastrop, a small town near Austin, the state
capital. 6 2 Because the case was never reported and not appealed to the
Fifth Circuit, it is not widely known, even though it was in proximity to
1954's Brown v. Board of Education and followed Westminster School
District v. Mendez, 16 the April 1947 Ninth Circuit decision successfully
brought by Mexican American plaintiffs against California schools. The
Delgado decision angered local officials who did not want the ruling
upheld or widened to other districts. At the time, before it was split into
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the Fifth Circuit extended all the way
from Texas to Florida, and a decision by the circuit upholding Delgado
would have had bearing upon the Southern judges and the region's Jim
Crow schools and social practices.'"6 Valencia carefully details the many
instances of "intransigence and subterfuge"' 6 ' by disgruntled school offi-
cials and brings light to this most obscure steppingstone to Brown. He
also usefully points out the intersections connecting the lawyers of Men-
dez, Delgado, and Brown, who corresponded and interacted behind the
scenes; for example, Gus Garcia and Carlos Cadena tried Delgado, hop-
ing to replicate the victory by non-Latino lawyers in the earlier Mendez
case.i16 As historian Guadalupe San Miguel and many other careful
scholars have shown, there was state perfidy in the resolution of the case
in Bastrop, while the school board simply forged ahead, employing the
official trope of the children's "special linguistic needs" to continue iso-
lating them from their Anglo counterparts.167
In Mendez v. Westminster: School Desegregation and Mexican-
American Rights, Philippa Strum has written the first full-length book on
this Ninth Circuit case. 68 For the same reasons that Delgado is important
162. VALENCIA, supra note 63, at 49-50.
163. 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
164. See Carlos Kevin Blanton, A Legacy of Neglect: George I. Sanchez, Mexican American
Education, and the Ideal of Integration, 1940-1970, TCHRS. C. REC., June 2012, at 1, 1-27; see also
Neil Foley, Over the Rainbow: Hernandez v. Texas, Brown v. Board of Education, and Black v.
Brown, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 139, 146-51 (2005); see generally Ian Haney Lopez, Race and
Colorblindness After Hernandez and Brown, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 61 passim (2005) (dis-
cussing the effects of Hernandez); Steven Harmon Wilson, Some Are Born White, Some Achieve
Whiteness, and Some Have Whiteness Thrust upon Them: Mexican Americans and the Politics of
Racial Classification in the Federal Judicial Bureaucracy, Twenty-five Years After Hernandez v.
Texas, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 201 passim (2005) (discussing the effects of Hernandez).
165. VALENCIA, supra note 63, at 52.
166. Id.
167. Guadalupe San Miguel, among others, has shown that Latino children's purported "spe-
cial linguistic needs" were employed to continue isolating them from their Anglo counterparts, both
in the early twentieth-century cases, and even those since. Readers familiar with the fascinating and
extensive treatments of Brown by Kluger, Tushnet, and many other accomplished scholars would do
well to reread the case through the lens of Valencia, Martinez, and others who have filled in the
parallel tracks. SAN MIGUEL, JR., supra note 60, at 117-34; see also Nancy MacLean, The Civil
Rights Act and the Transformation of Mexican American Identity and Politics, 18 LA RAZA L.J. 123,
128, 130 (2007); Moran, supra note 22, at 326-41.
168. PHILIPPA STRUM, MENDEZ V. WESTMINSTER: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND MEXICAN-
AMERICAN RIGHTS (2010).
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on the road to Brown, so is Mendez.169 Strum explains the many strands
that led to the case, including previous litigation (there were few Califor-
nia cases on point but enough to suggest how to proceed), how the plain-
tiffs came to their grievance (their children were not admitted into the
better school in the Westminster system, located outside Los Angeles,
due to their alleged lack of fluency in English), how they picked their
lawyer (he had litigated a public accommodations case that led to inte-
gration of the San Bernardino public swimming pools and parks), how he
strategized with other civil rights lawyers and organizations, and what
came of the holding after the State of California lost (the state passed an
antisegregation statute in June 1947, signed into law by Governor Earl
Warren). 17 0 Through its journey to the Ninth Circuit, Mendez drew upon
White, Jewish, Asian, and African American lawyers but not a single
Latino or Mexican American attorney. I had not put two and two togeth-
er to connect the appearance of A.L. Wirin, who served as co-counsel in
both Mendez and Delgado; for that matter, I had not known he had been
involved in litigation following the earlier Sleepy Lagoon violence
against Mexican Americans, 17 1 or that afterward he had gone on to try
169. See Carlos K. Blanton, George I. Sdnchez, Ideology, and Whiteness in the Making of the
Mexican American Civil Rights Movement: 1930-1960, 72 J. S. HIsT. 570, 589, 595 (2006); Jeanne
M. Powers & Lirio Patton, Between Mendez and Brown: Gonzales v. Sheely (1951) and the Legal
Campaign Against Segregation, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 127 passim (2008); Wilson, supra note 18, at
156; see generally Bowman, supra note 15, at 919-29 (discussing the isolation felt by Latino/a
students as a result of segregation and linguistic differences).
170. STRUM, supra note 168, at 38-41, 68, 140. I have read this case many times over the
years, along with many of the law reviews and the historical literature about the case. I thought I
knew the details, but I learned much from Strum's book. The texture she reveals is an excellent
example of why the backstories to important cases are so essential to understanding the full context.
Strum is particularly accomplished at the telling detail; for instance, her account of how the Mendez
family took up the cause, especially with a Mexican American father and Puerto Rican mother, and
at some risk to their social standing, is particularly compelling.
However, she is not as sure in her grasp of the post-Mendez matters. She mistakenly
places the four school districts in the Delgado v. Bastrop case as being in "south Texas," id. at 149,
when any political and topographical map would locate the three counties and four school districts in
central Texas, including Travis County, where the case was tried in Austin federal court. The actual
geography matters less than the considerable political cartography between Anglo Texas and the
predominantly Mexican American south Texas and border areas. She does not dwell upon Delgado,
although in many respects it was as crucial to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's strategy as was
Mendez, and was tried in the same courts as was Sweatt v. Painter, already begun against the Uni-
versity of Texas. I do not think that her rendition of the founding of the Mexican American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund squares with all the available facts, or that the NAACP "contacted
Pete Tijerina" and "offered to use some of [its Ford Foundation] money to help Mexican-American
lawyers in Texas with litigation." Id. at 154-55. Remarkably, there has never been a full-length book
on MALDEF or its founding, so the accurate version is still to be told. I also do not believe that it
would be correct to characterize the funds that University of Texas Professor George I. SAnchez had
at his disposal as "LULAC" funds, the way she describes them. Id. at 149. These may seem quibbles,
but her telling of these details is not nearly as sure-handed as her account of the Mendez case. One
last haunting connection among these books involves the sad demise of David Marcus, the lead
Mendez lawyer. These small details aside, I am grateful that the Kansas University series on land-
mark Supreme Court cases apparently made an exception for this case, which did not reach the U.S.
Supreme Court or achieve the iconic status of those in its other books, and grateful that Strum decid-
ed to write about it.
171. Wirin, Abraham Lincoln, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPANESE AMERICAN HISTORY: AN A-TO-
Z REFERENCE FROM 1868 TO THE PRESENT, 412, 412-13 (Brian Niiya ed., 2d ed. 2001). Wirin
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Gonzales v. Sheely,172 in Arizona, or that he had later argued several im-
portant civil rights cases before the U.S. Supreme Court1 73 and filed an
amicus in Serrano.174 Ironically, the case most often considered to be an
early "Mexican American" case, Mendez, involved no Mexican Ameri-
can lawyers, and because it was a California case rather than a Texas
case, it had no significant involvement from the dominant Mexican
American political organizations or the sociocultural community. How-
ever, Mendez did segue into and, through the connections noted here,
influenced Delgado, Hernandez, and the cases that flowed eventually
into the MALDEF "river" Richard Valencia has evocatively described.17 5
Following the Plyler "river," MALDEF's purposive reputation was
established, leading to a larger docket and more important litigation. In
1982, MALDEF won Plyler v. Doe, concerning undocumented children,
its most important U.S. Supreme Court victory to that point.17 6 In 2006,
MALDEF lawyers won in LULAC v. Perry,17 7 a voting rights Supreme
Court case that had Latinos and Latinas on both sides, and because of the
majority's complex decision, allowed Nina Perales for MALDEF and
Teodoro Cruz, the Texas solicitor general, to each claim victory on dif-
ferent sides.'78 Organizational capacity is the comprehensive collection
of institutional resources gathered by purposive groups, including finan-
cial support and political capital, the collective reputational resources,
and the technical capability to bring complex cases to court, as is re-
quired today. While it was first organizing itself, MALDEF was fortu-
nate to have senior and experienced leadership and access to talented
Mexican American and Anglo lawyers, but the ranks were thin. A num-
(1901-1978) served as an attorney for the Congress of industrial Organizations (CIO), the ACLU of
Southern California, and for the Japanese American Citizens League. Id He and David C. Marcus
both figured prominently as Anglo advocates for Mexican Americans. Id. For a review of Marcus's
personal life, see generally Genevieve Carpio, Unexpected Allies: David C Marcus and His Impact
on the Advancement of Civil Rights in the Mexican-American Legal Landscape of Southern Calfor-
nia, in BEYOND ALLIANCES: THE JEWISH ROLE IN RESHAPING THE RACIAL LANDSCAPE OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 1, 1-23 (George J. SAnchez ed., 2012). He was the lawyer for an important
World War II, Chicano housing discrimination case, Doss v. Bernal, No. 41466 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1943). See generally Robert Chao Romero & Luis Fernando Fernandez, Doss v. Bernal:
Ending Mexican Apartheid in Orange County, UCLA CHICANO STUD. RES. CENTER (Feb. 2012),
http://www.chicano.ucla.edu/publications/report-brief/doss-v-bernal.
172. 96 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Ariz. 1951).
173. He argued Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943), Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), and Oyama v. Cahifornia, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), before the U.S. Supreme Court, and
served as a lawyer to Sirhan Sirhan, Robert F. Kennedy's assassin, hitting the cycle for representing
unpopular persons and causes. See Wirin Abraham Lincoln, supra note 171, at 412; Controversy
over Defense ofSirhan, LODI NEWS-SENTINEL (Lodi, Calif.), June 19, 1968, at 2.
174. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Cal. 1971). MALDEF filed as amicus as well, as
did several other players in the Rodriguez litigation. Id.
175. VALENCIA, supra note 63, at 319.
176. See Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal
Protection ofAliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 82 nn.148 & 149 (1985); Peter H. Schuck, The Trans-
formation oflmmigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54 (1984).
177. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
178. See id at 447 (holding that MALDEF won the argument concerning Congressional Dis-
trict 23, while Texas was upheld on District 25).
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ber of the early lawyers were short term, and there was much turnover,
politicized personnel decisions, and gaps in personnel. More than three-
quarters of its early cases in Texas were desegregation cases, which re-
quired considerable legal and technical sophistication, social science
research capability and expertise, and sufficient political and legal re-
sources to try the years-long cases. 179 MALDEF lost many of these, and
even when it did prevail, often it had to wait many years to receive attor-
ney's fees, rather like wildcatting in courts instead of in oil fields. While
it is true that MALDEF did prevail by obtaining single-member voting
districts in the original White v. Regester, the case was in the genre of
complex ongoing litigation, decided in 1973, but remanded for further
findings, and the remand was finalized by the Supreme Court in 1975,
when single-member districts were maintained as a voting rights tool.s 0
In the 1973 decision, the Court had held:
Very likely, larger differences between districts would not be tolera-
ble without justification "based on legitimate considerations incident
to the effectuation of a rational state policy," but here we are confi-
dent that appellees failed to carry their burden of proof insofar as
they sought to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
from population variations alone. The total variation between two
districts was 9.9%, but the average deviation of all House districts
from the ideal was 1.82%. Only 23 districts, all single-member, were
overrepresented or underrepresented by more than 3%, and only three
of those districts by more than 5%. We are unable to conclude from
these deviations alone that appellees satisfied the threshold require-
ment of proving a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause. Because the District Court had a contra-
ry view, its judgment must be reversed in this respect.' 8'
Thus, White was MALDEF's first major case taken to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, where it was argued by Edward Idar Jr., along with lawyers
representing the African American plaintiffs and where the sole ami-
cus-the League of Women Voters-urged affirmance of the minority
plaintiffs' position.182 In this case, MALDEF established itself as a force
to be reckoned with on voting and electoral litigation, and the 1975 re-
mand brought the relief that MALDEF had hoped would come to the
voting practices in San Antonio and elsewhere, where the organization
was founded and where it was headquartered at the time. The detailed
statistical voting behavior, electoral politics, and mathematical analyses
179. As detailed in note 125, supra, Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131 (9th
Cir. 2011), or its predecessors, has been active since the early 1970s in an attempt to desegregate
Tucson schools. Edgewood and its variants have the potential to consume many decades. See Albert
H. Kauffman, The Texas School Finance Litigation Saga: Great Progress, then Near Death by a
Thousand Cuts, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 511 passim (2008).
180. White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935 (1975).
181. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973) (citations omitted) (quoting Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)).
182. Id at 756.
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required for the case revealed the kind of deep analytic and technical
expertise that the organization would need, either by employing lawyers
and experts in-house or by cultivating access to these progressive schol-
ars and lawyers who could undertake this work on an outside consultant
basis.
Rather than actually litigating a number of significant cases such as
Rodriguez and Lau, MALDEF followed an early strategy of filing ami-
cus briefs to focus those courts upon the pending legal and constitutional
issues affecting Mexican Americans.183 In some instances, particularly
for a nascent organization, this was an efficacious means of having some
say in complex litigation or of actually intervening late in cases that had
already been in progress when the Mexican American interests formally
surfaced. Keyes is a good example of this strategy, when MALDEF in-
tervened in litigation brought by White and African American litigants in
the Southwestern city of Denver.184 But in a city where the enrollment in
the public schools was more Mexican American than it was African
American and where educational programs and services for Chicanos
were inescapably different than those for African American children, this
strategy revealed the weakness of MALDEF's overarching efforts to be
the group that would draw attention to educational failures and discrimi-
natory practices for its Mexican American clients. Intervenors, by defini-
183. It has been suggested to me that filing amicus briefs can be merely a symbolic act, espe-
cially if it is a case that attracts many dozens of such briefs, as in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003), and Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), major U.S. Supreme
Court affirmative action admissions cases, but that sometimes a substantive and salient brief will
score with the Court. Mitchell J. Chang et al., Beyond Magical Thinking: Doing the Real Work of
Diversifying Our Institutions, ABOUT CAMPUS, May-June 2005, at 9, I1; Scott Jaschik, Friends of
Affirmative Action, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 14, 2012, 3:00 AM),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/08/14/college-groups-flood-supreme-court-briefs-
defending-affirmative-action. I am not gainsaying the effect that amicus participation can have on a
given matter, but the impact of being an amicus is almost always less dramatic and less effective
than would be participating as a litigant or, failing that, as an intervenor. Any mature purposive
organization involved in a U.S. Supreme Court practice will likely have occasion to do both, as a
form of the requisite signaling that is the major activity of such groups. In my experience, it is also a
matter of political economy because many law firms and legal scholars will get involved in cases
they do not have time or resources to try, but to which they can contribute writing and drafting
services on behalf of potential amici.
184. See generally Romero, II, supra note 12, at 141; Roos, supra note 17, at 257-58. Legal
historian Marc Simon Rodriguez has noted this accurately in the early cases:
One other reason for the lack of risk taking may have stemmed from the fact that
most Mexican-American litigation was an underfunded and often grass roots affair and
not a well organized bureaucratic effort with a functioning headquarters and annual
budget. Mexican-American civil rights lawyering, prior to the founding of the Mexican-
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) in 1968, lacked the organiza-
tion and funding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's
(NAACP) Legal Defense Fund [LDF]. Mexican-Americans lacked the national network
of membership and supportive non-minority sponsors that the NAACP relied on. Because
Mexican-Americans existed outside the black-white paradigm, the reform efforts relied
on a small group of lawyers and individual litigants who worked with meager budgets
and their formal status as "whites" to challenge their segregation and mistreatment at the
hands of Anglos.
Marc Simon Rodriguez, More than Whiteness: Comparative Perspectives on Mexican American
Citizenship, 18 LA RAZA L. J. 79, 81 (2007) (footnote omitted).
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tion, do not get to direct litigation strategies, and the poor results from
Keyes show this as well as any other example could. Although it was
becoming a repeat amicus player and purposive organization bringing
cases, at this time, MALDEF simply did not have sufficient organiza-
tional capacity or lawyer stability to bring better cases or choose its own
litigation.
Intervening late or submitting amicus briefs also are unlikely to
generate fees should the original plaintiffs prevail. There was also an
evident lack of focus in the earliest MALDEF docket, with efforts
splayed along many fronts. Historian San Miguel gives examples of cas-
es that, even if the plaintiffs had prevailed, would not have had a major
impact or provided political and fiscal resources, such as the many stu-
dents and faculty who were discriminated against in school struggles.185
These were important cases, especially to the parties, but they simply did
not have enough traction to serve as major litigation foci, especially
when the bulk of the cases were the small-town Texas desegregation
cases, themselves expensive and elusive, especially before a judiciary
that did not consider Chicanos to have been discriminated against or
marginalized.'86 This invisibility meant that MALDEF had to establish
185. San Miguel notes that the earliest cases brought by MALDEF were often designed to bail
out and defend students who had been involved in school protests, walkouts, and other activism:
"MALDEF became a key supporter of student activists and contributed both to the shaping of legal
principles to eliminate discrimination against Mexican Americans and to establishing special ser-
vices aimed at promoting equality in American life." SAN MIGUEL, JR., supra note 60, at 169. Histo-
rian Steven Wilson, in his authoritative review of these early litigation patterns, especially informed
by his interaction with Texas lawyer James DeAnda, notes the rise of the Chicano student movement
that grew up at the same time MALDEF was becoming established. See Wilson, supra note 18, at
176. In some instances, these protests took the form of civil disobedience and defiance against
school authorities, including short-lived "huelga (strike) schools." See Wilson, supra note 165, at
214-15 n.42; see generally DAVID MONTEJANO, QUIXOTE'S SOLDIERS: A LOCAL HISTORY OF THE
CHICANO MOVEMENT, 1966-1981, passim (2010) (describing the work of second-generation Chica-
no civil rights movement organizations); CARLOS MU&OZ, JR., YOUTH, IDENTITY, POWER: THE
CHICANO MOVEMENT passim (2d ed. 2007) (describing the origins of the 1960s Chicano civil rights
movement).
186. Sometimes, the court just threw up its hands, as happened in a version of the Houston
desegregation case (begun in a different guise in 1956), Ross v. Eckels, 434 F.2d 1140 (1970), a case
involving the LDF but no Latino organizations or lawyers:
Of more ominous portent is the type of partial racial balancing the majority opinion
actually effects. Approximately 36,000 students in the Houston, Texas system are Span-
ish surnamed Americans. They have been adjudicated to be statistically white. As the ma-
jority states, we know they live in the very areas required to be paired with all or predom-
inantly Negro schools. I say it is mock justice when we "force" the numbers by pairing
disadvantaged Negro students into schools with members of this equally disadvantaged
ethnic group. I would be greatly surprised if a single school teacher could be found in the
entire Houston independent School District who would testify that the educational needs
of either of these groups is advanced by such pairings. We seem to have forgotten that the
equal protection right enforced is a right to education, not statistical integration. Why, on
this kind of a theory, we could end our problems by the simple expedient of requiring that
in compiling statistics every student in every school be alternately labeled white and Ne-
gro. Then, you see, everything would come out 50-50 and could get our seal of approval
once and for all.
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the bona fides of its population and politics each time and in each case,
even in small-town Texas and other inhospitable venues where the de
facto educational and political practices were widespread and long estab-
lished.
MALDEF suffered underachievement in its earliest years-or did
not reach its peak quickly-until it had the institutional maturity and
organizational discipline to choose how to frame issues strategically and
to pick its cases carefully. This is a subgenre of its failure to focus, and
even though the organization was never a membership organization, such
as the ACLU and original NAACP Legal Defense Fund models, it at-
tempted to redress the widespread discriminatory practices that its clients
faced, especially in the hostile Southwestern states. San Miguel's careful
count of MALDEF litigation (by trials or other legal means and amicus
briefs) in its first full decade revealed nearly 100 total cases in Texas
alone, including seventy-one involving desegregation, seven in political
rights, six in voting, four in employment, three in educational finance,
and two other cases, totaling ninety-three from 1970 to 1981.187 Bursting
on the scene as it did, there was enormous early pressure to sue widely
and to establish itself as a litigious purposive organization; San Miguel
notes an early admonition that it was to be reckoned with: "Let all of
them take heed." 88
MALDEF then, as now, partnered with a number of advocacy
groups, including Latino groups such as LULAC and the American G.I.
Forum, others who offered themselves as named plaintiffs for a number
of cases, and other purposive groups whose litigation interests aligned
with those of Mexican Americans. These broke into distinct groupings,
each with a different valence and resource requirement and with varying
centripetal forces for MALDEF's consideration. First, there were the
cases that the organization brought on behalf of Mexican Americans in
the various agenda areas, where the organization had its own clients and
directed the litigation, such as Serna, an early New Mexico bilingual
The law in this field is entirely empirical. All must admit we are just beginning ex-
perimentations to find our way along an obscure path to the constitutional goal of a uni-
tary school system-one in which no child shall be effectively excluded from any school
on account of race or color. I predict that we shall soon discover in this as in other exper-
imentation that a basic rule holds which requires ingredients and methods to be intro-
duced singly, not in groups or bunches, lest the experiment continuously fail because one
new departure cancelled out the benefits that came from another.
Id. at 1150 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
187. SAN MIGUEL, JR., supra note 60.
188. Id As illustrated in the Richard Valencia study of Chicano desegregation litigation, Mexi-
can Americans brought almost three dozen cases in state and federal courts between 1925 and 1976,
the last seventeen in the first decade of MALDEF's existence. VALENCIA, supra note 63, at 8 tbl. 1.1.
It was this sense of momentum that prompted Mario Obledo to respond in the words that make up
the title of this study: "MALDEF slowly evolved, according to Obledo, from 'a legal organization of
militants' into a 'law firm for the Latino community' as it entered into new areas of litigation . . . ."
David A. Badillo, MALDEF and the Evolution of Latino Civil Rights, RES. REP., Jan. 2005, at 4, 7
(quoting Interview with Mario Obledo, Former MALDEF President (Aug. 2003)).
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education case.'89 A second group of collaborations included secondary
amicus participation as the vehicle of solidarity with other litigation ef-
forts, as took place in Serrano, the successful California state court
school finance litigation, decided for Chicano plaintiffs in the Supreme
Court of California under the Constitution of the State of California, and
in Rodriguez, where lead attorney Arthur Gochman argued the case as a
school finance matter rather than as a racial or ethnic equity case.' 90 As
became evident, this partnering strategy enabled MALDEF to broaden its
reach and general influence, but its result shows the difficulties that arise
when any group comes somewhat late to the party or operates on the
periphery as one of the many amicus brief sponsors. Third, there arose a
formal intervenor option, as in Keyes, after the Tenth Circuit had already
ruled on the case, and the late party could not dictate the litigation strate-
gy. The Tenth Circuit actually relied upon the advice rendered by
MALDEF in its remand to the district court, but the relief and remedy
were managed by the original plaintiffs and defendant school board, not
by intervenor amici.' 9' MALDEF chose this third option sparingly, as in
Ross v. Eckels'9 2 and other cases where MALDEF sought to become in-
tervenors and shape the litigation strategy beyond the more scholarly
amicus route.' 93
189. Serna v. Portales Mun. Sch., 499 F. 2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
190. See Heise, supra note 57, at 54; Albert Kauffman, Texas School Finance Litigation: Great
Progress and Some Regression, in A QUALITY EDUCATION FOR EVERY CHILD: STORIES FROM THE
LAWYERS ON THE FRONT LINES 109, 112-13 (David Long et al. eds., 2009); Albert Kauffman &
Carmen Maria Rumbaut, Applying Edgewood v. Kirby to Analysis ofFundamental Rights Under the
Texas Constitution, 22 ST. MARY'S L. J. 69, 86-91 (1991).
191. A robust and inconsistent examination about the group's racial construction continued in
jurisprudence until 1973, when Keyes seemed to settle the issue.
Notably absent from much of this discourse was the voice of MALDEF in each of
the court's deliberations. Although, the question of why exactly this was needs more re-
search, it is clear that MALDEF was keeping close tabs on these developments as the or-
ganization began to conceptualize what would emerge as a distinctly Chicano litigation
strategy. From its inception, the organization encountered a world that defined Mexican
Americans in relation to White power and privilege....
Equally noticeable in these initial stages, moreover, was a consistent and conscious
effort to describe Mexican American segregation and mistreatment as similar in degree if
not equivalent to the experience of Blacks... .They also went to segregated schools that
were dilapidated and underachieving and encountered racist and discriminatory attitudes
in private and public settings on a consistent basis.... Centrally important in this de-
scription is MALDEF's conscious effort to insert Mexican Americans into a racial and
color paradigm.
Romero, 11, supra note 12, at 138-39 (footnotes omitted).
192. 468 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1972). Ross v. Eckels had been litigated for several years before
MALDEF intervened.
193. Dean Rachel Moran, among the most thoughtful observers of the complex issues involv-
ing litigation and bilingual education, noted this feature in her appraisal of Keyes:
Keyes, like most institutional reform cases, implicates a wide range of divergent in-
terests. The case is far more than a simple dispute between LEP and NEP students and
the school district. It illustrates tensions between bilingual education advocates and pro-
ponents of desegregation as well as potential conflicts among multiple language groups.
Although Keyes indicates that the district's willingness to comply with a decree is of con-
cem, it also demonstrates that representatives of LEP and NEP children can overcome
this intransigence in part by forging alliances with educators, such as those in [the Con-
11992013]
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Any such partnership arrangement meant that MALDEF would not
be in the driver's seat and thus would not be setting the terms of the rep-
resentation and the scope of the litigation. As focused litigation groups
gain more experience, they seek to bring the litigation themselves so as
to manage it throughout, including the resource allocation and strategic
litigation choices, particularly the crucial issues of which cases to under-
take and which entities should be sued, in what capacity, and under what
theory of the case. There is a wistful sense that MALDEF in particular
might have either undertaken the Rodriguez case-likely making more of
its racial and ethnic discrimination roots-or at least intervened more
authoritatively to move it in this direction. One educational historian who
has carefully studied the biographies of school finance cases has noted of
this dimension:
As well, the now-substantial intellectual and scholarly attention to
school finance today was only emerging at the time [plaintiffs' attor-
ney Arthur] Gochman crafted the Rodriguez complaint and, as a con-
sequence, Gochman had comparatively fewer scholarly assets to lev-
erage.
Interestingly (especially so in the shadow of the concurrent school
desegregation litigation), the Rodriguez complaint did not pursue ra-
cial (or ethnic) discrimination theories. Indeed, Gochman assiduously
avoided casting the Rodriguez case as a "race" case. He ignored the
racial and ethnic dimensions even though the Edgewood district was
overwhelmingly Hispanic and the Alamo Heights district predomi-
nately white. Nevertheless, Rodriguez was consciously framed as a
finance case and the attorneys in Rodriguez emphasized the Edge-
wood district's poverty rather than the district's overwhelmingly non-
white citizenry.
What might explain the strategic decision to cast Rodriguez in fi-
nancial rather than racial or ethnic terms? After all, racial discrimina-
tion was the dominant theme of the quickly maturing school desegre-
gation jurisprudence. The absence of perfect correlation between eth-
nicity and geography might have deterred Gochman. (If so, his intui-
tion was vindicated by the Court's reliance on a study by Professor
Burke documenting something less than a perfect correlation between
a school district's percentage of minority students and per pupil
spending levels.) Although Edgewood was overwhelmingly Hispan-
ic, it was not exclusively so. Similarly, while Alamo Heights was
predominately white, some-albeit few-residents were either His-
gress of Hispanic Educators], who have an interest in promoting bilingual education pro-
grams. To address more comprehensively the multiplicity of interests affected by Keyes,
future research will have to examine not only the litigators' perspectives but also those of
their LEP and NEP clients, the judge, litigators and clients demanding desegregation, and
community representatives of other language groups. Only then will the interplay of liti-
gation strategies, judicial responses, and meaningful reform be more fully understood.
Moran, Lessons of Keyes, supra note 15, at 203.
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panic or non-white. Another possibility is that the predominately
Hispanic Edgewood residents were simply more interested in increas-
ing resources for their schools than in increasing racial and ethnic in-
tegration levels. Regardless of the reason, it is difficult to overstate
the strategic importance of the decision to frame Rodriguez in terms
of poverty and education rather than in terms of race and ethnicity. 194
The complexities noted by Professor Heise exist in all these high-
wire cases, even if they are brought by a single firm or solo practitioner
with no purposive institutional support, but cohesion among the plaintiff
parties is a genuine necessity in any joint endeavor brought as a civil
rights case. The Rodriguez and Keyes cases showed the early and inexpe-
rienced MALDEF, but produced the sophisticated brief in Keyes-
written by staff attorneys Michael Mendelson and Alan Exelrod and
President and General Counsel Mario Obledo-which became the blue-
print of the relief requested of the Court following its remand in 1974.
These developments showed that MALDEF was improving its work
product and gaining the litigation experience necessary to become a more
effective repeat player in these cases.195 That Rodriguez and Keyes were
decided by the Supreme Court on the same day symbolizes MALDEF's
growing expertise in salient cases; although it did not act as lead litigator
in either case, its alignment with the private practitioner Gochman in the
former and with the Anglo Denver lawyers and the established NAACP
LDF in the latter showed the promise envisioned by the MALDEF
founders: that Mexican Americans in the community would have access
to their own national law firm, undertaking national civil rights litigation
on a widespread basis. As the preeminent legal historian of Keyes has
noted, MALDEF's DNA was all over the case, even if the relief ordered
was not what the organization had sought and even if it were an arranged
marriage:
Although Denver's diverse racial populations challenged the use-
fulness of the black-white dichotomy in constitutional law, the Tenth
Circuit's rejection of Judge Doyle's desegregation remedy ensured
194. Heise, supra note 57, at 55 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
195. The influential MALDEF lawyer Peter Roos noted that the apparent victory by MALDEF
in Serna did not lead to a similar remedial result in Keyes, even though the two cases were close in
time to each other and both in the same appellate jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit, making it difficult
to mount consistent litigation strategies in cases ranging from small Portales, New Mexico, to large
urban Denver, Colorado. (He might have added that it made a difference who brings the cases.)
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit appeared to endorse the fact that "a meaningful desegregation
plan" must help "Hispano school children to reach the proficiency in English necessary to
learn other basic subjects." Thus the Keyes decision, by the same circuit which had af-
firmed the extensive bilingual-bicultural education program in Serna, can be explained
by the failure to find either that the rights of Hispanic students under Title VI (as inter-
preted by Lau v. Nichols) or the Equal Educational Opportunities Act had been inde-
pendently violated or that the remedy was necessary to undo the effects of past segrega-
tion.
Roos, supra note 11, at 131 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465,
482 (10th Cir. 1975)).
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that Chicanos never seriously threatened the polarized premises of
American jurisprudence. In the legal battle to desegregate Denver's
schools, Mexican Americans were consistently described in relation
to their relative whiteness or blackness, not their Chicanoness.
Whether they were considered "other white" or, more recently, "oth-
er black," Mexican American students were denied a viable constitu-
tional remedy and were left to compete with African Americans for
limited resources in non-white Denver.
The attempt of Denver students, parents, educators, activists, law-
yers, and judges to come to grips with its multiracialized citizenry
suggests the challenges facing a demographically changing United
States. The equality claims of Denver's diverse student body vividly
demonstrated the extent that all these groups not only distinguished
themselves, but also claimed legal rights in multiracial terms. Alt-
hough in 1973 the United States Supreme Court wanted to use tri-
ethnic Denver to develop national principles of equality, subsequent
jurisprudence and legislative acts limited the implications of that de-
cision and instead reinforced the bi-racial fiction of law. Thus, de-
spite the efforts of Denver's Chicanos to declare that their "Selma"
would take place in the city's public schools, the law failed to appre-
ciate the multiracial transformation of the United States.196
The disappointment was also evident in Lau, where an Anglo law-
yer and Chinese American plaintiffs controlled the case strategy, even
with substantial amicus and consultative participation by MALDEF and
PRLDEF. 19 7 As legal scholar Rachel Moran has noted, the Lau lawyer
deliberately did not include Spanish-speakers in his strategy, in part be-
cause he was trying to finesse the recent Rodriguez ruling, but also be-
cause if he lost his case, it would not preclude opportunities for Latinos
to bring such cases:
Aware that the Court's recent [Rodriguez] ruling did not bode well
for his clients, [Lau attorney Edward H.] Steinman nevertheless pur-
sued Supreme Court review because he was confident that an adverse
ruling could be limited to the situation of Chinese-speaking students
in San Francisco. Attorneys representing Spanish speakers could
readily distinguish the case away.198
In high-stakes litigation, bringing the wrong case and losing can be more
harmful than not bringing a case at all, as bad precedents can take up the
oxygen in the room, consume all the available support resources, and
block the path for subsequent cases with better theories or better facts or,
196. Tom I. Romero, II, Our Selma Is Here: The Political and Legal Struggle for Education
Equality in Denver, Colorado, and Multiracial Conundrums in American Jurisprudence, 3 SEATTLE
J. SOC. JUST. 73, 123 (2004).
197. PRLDEF, founded in 1972 in New York City, later changed its name to LatinoJustice
PRLDEF.
198. Rachel F. Moran, The Story of Lau v. Nichols: Breaking the Silence in Chinatown, in
EDUCATION LAW STORIES, supra note 57, at 129.
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for that matter, better purposive groups, who might be better situated for
the contest.
The disappointing Rodriguez results cut off the federal route to
school finance equity, but the Serrano, Cahill, and other state constitu-
tional challenges were more clearly the proper pathway to advocates. By
the time a decade later that Texas school finance was litigated again, the
roadmap was Serrano-inspired state court constitutional challenges, and
it was MALDEF that was asserting its expertise and calling the shots in a
remarkable decade-plus run of education cases, the Texas Supreme
Court's Edgewood opinions. By the time these cases were brought and
tried, MALDEF had become the major player in such Southwest chal-
lenges and a major national school finance player. San Antonio lawyer,
MALDEF Regional Counsel Albert Kauffman, now a law professor, and
the organization undertook Edgewood I (1984-1989),199 Edgewood II
(1990-1991),200 Edgewood Ha (1991),201 Edgewood III (1991-1992),202
Edgewood IV (1993-1995),203 Edgewood V (2001-2003),204 Edgewood
VI (2003-2006),205 and successor cases, all in state courts in Texas. 20 6
And, the Lobato v. State of Colorado litigation207 was still making its
way through Colorado courts.2 08 Professor Heise notes:
Just over one decade following the [1974] Rodriguez decision, an-
other lawsuit was filed, this time in Texas state court. Unlike the ini-
tial lawsuit, in the state litigation the Mexican American Legal De-
fense and Education Fund (MALDEF) took the litigation lead and ar-
gued that Texas'[s] school finance system violated the state's equal
protection and education clause. 209
199. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
200. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood ll), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991).
201. Order Denying Motion for Rehearing, Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, No. D-0378
(Tex. Feb. 7, 1991).
202. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. (Edge-
wood Ill), 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992).
203. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995).
204. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alanis (Edgewood V), 107 S.W.3d 558
(Tex. 2003).
205. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. (Edgewood VI), 176 S.W.3d 746
(Tex. 2005).
206. For excellent and careful work on these complex cases, see Kauffman & Rumbaut, supra
note 190.
207. MALDEF's newest Leviathan school finance case is Lobato v. State of Colorado. See,
e.g., Brief for Brennan Center for Justice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellees,
State v. Lobato, 304 P.3d 1132 (Colo. 2013); Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, Lobato v.
State of Colorado, (Sept. 26, 2012), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resourcellobato v. state of colorado/. As this Article was in
its final stages, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its disappointing opinion: "[T]he current public
school financing system complies with the ... Colorado Constitution. . . ." State v. Lobato, 304
P.3d 1132, 1144 (Colo. 2013).
208. Fortunately, this complex litigation project has been encyclopedically analyzed by its
chief participant-lawyer observer. See Kauffman, supra note 179.
209. Heise, supra note 57, at 70 (footnote omitted).
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As he might have noted, MALDEF by then was no longer outside look-
ing in.
In the complex ecosystem of school finance litigation, there was al-
ways the strategic reckoning to determine the best approach to the actual
finance inequity, as in the Rodriguez decision to bring that case in federal
court and then to treat it as a finance issue rather than as a racial and eth-
nic parity issue.21 o Case management was particularly difficult in this
type of litigation, for dozens of social scientists on both sides were com-
missioned to undertake research, and, as the court noted, "The trial was
delayed for two years to permit extensive pretrial discovery and to allow
completion of a pending Texas legislative investigation concerning the
need for reform of its public school finance system." 2 1 1 The California
state court decision in Serrano, where Chicano plaintiffs prevailed in a
case brought primarily by non-Chicano lawyers, forged a pathway that
involved determinations of what constituted "equity," "(in)adequacy,"
"(in)efficiency," and "equalization"-terms that make it clear how social
science and economic technical expertise play a role.2 12 The problems of
issue drift materialize, requiring detailed case management and focused
litigation capacity, especially when these cases play out over such long
periods of time, often necessitating coordination across cohorts of law-
yers, not just on the plaintiffs' side, but also continuity across changes in
teams of defendants, political actors, and court personnel.2 13
Such complexity and case management proficiency and adroitness
are more evident in repeat group players, whose deep expertise and or-
ganizational resources assure that they will be involved over the long
periods of time that such a litigation strategy requires. Issue drift will
likely test the ability of focused purposive organizations to hone in sub-
stantively in the way that complex litigation necessitates; this will be
particularly difficult in organizations that have multiple purposes and
programs and where litigation will not be the only focus. From its earli-
est efforts, it became evident that voting behavior and ultimately Voting
Rights Act (VRA) litigation, especially VRA Section 5 pre-clearance and
language minority provisions, would become the premier vehicle for
210. See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
211. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (1973).
212. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1247 (Cal. 1971).
213. For example, Serrano had five lawyers trying the case for the plaintiffs and appellants in
the Supreme Court of California, and almost thirty lawyers from amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs
and appellants, including several representing MALDEF (Mario Obledo, Alan Exelrod, and Michael
Mendelson, as in Keyes), and the sojourner A.L. Wirin. See id. at 1243. There is some evidence that
the Ford Foundation, in helping to establish MALDEF, hoped that by funding scholarships and
underwriting litigation, a cadre of professional Chicanos would emerge to strategize and support the
community litigation. See, e.g., Victoria-Maria MacDonald & Benjamin Polk Hoffman, "Compro-
mising La Causa? ": The Ford Foundation and Chicano Intellectual Nationalism in the Creation of
Chicano History, 1963-1977, 52 HIsT. EDUC. Q. 251 passim (2012) (examining the effect of the
Ford Foundation on the Chicano civil rights movement).
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MALDEF litigation and would become among the country's leading
such voices in this important domain.214
But MALDEF was also interested in other important areas, all of
them interconnected with the relative lack of political resources that had
led to such community powerlessness at all levels in the polity. So while
VRA and political participation litigation were key areas of expertise,
especially with the increased technical requirements for redistricting and
the mathematical elements of line drawing, other areas were important
for the comprehensive litigation reputation the organization was develop-
ing. In quick succession, the organization was also participating in dif-
ferent degrees and with varying levels of success in U.S. Supreme Court
litigation in the large domains of desegregation, equal opportunity,
school finance, bilingual instruction, and-with the advent of Plyler in
September 1977, when Pete Tijerina wrote Joaquin Avila about the Tex-
as statute that had just become law-immigration and immigrant educa-
tion as well.2 15 By the time that this case ripened, MALDEF was a fully
mature, national, and purposive organization, competent to handle the
complex case management and to determine its own organizational tra-
jectory. Thus, although Plyler was not the first Supreme Court case
brought by MALDEF or in which the organization participated, it was
arguably the first case in which it fully determined its own fate and its
own place in the polity, even as it teamed with Peter Schey's Center for
Human Rights and Constitutional Law, a newly formed NGO that would
have its own trajectory and purposive resources. Since that litigation,
MALDEF has managed the post-Plyler developments, most notably the
several attempts to overturn it, particularly California's Proposition 187,
leading to a Ninth Circuit victory in the 1997 LULAC v. Wilson and ne-
gotiations with the State to settle the matter before it could do serious
harm;216 MALDEF has also fended off subsequent federal legislative
threats such as the Gallegly amendment.217
Political scientist Vanessa Baird noted the maturation of MALDEF
into a transformative "policy entrepreneur[]" when she wrote:
The story about assistance for prenatal care for illegal immigrants
in California was not over when Proposition 187 was declared un-
constitutional [in the 1997 MALDEF case, LULAC v. Wilson and its
settlement by the State]. Actors at the state and federal level respond-
ed to the court's decision by using whatever influence they could to
214. See Juan Cartagena, Latinos and Section S of the Voting Rights Act: Beyond Black and
White, 18 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 201 passim (2004); Rodolfo 0. de la Garza & Louis DeSipio, Save the
Baby, Change the Bathwater, and Scrub the Tub: Latino Electoral Participation After Seventeen
Years of Voting Rights Act Coverage, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1479 passim (1993) (examining the history of
the Voting Rights Act and Latino communities).
215. Letter from Avila to Roos, supra note 44.
216. Supra note 108.
217. See generally PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL
BATILE TO SAVE POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 141-43, 176-78 (2000).
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change policy in their desired direction. [When] pro-immigrant poli-
cy entrepreneurs were presented with a new law to challenge, they
used information from recent Supreme Court decisions to identify the
best possible legal strategy. The new legal strategy, one that would
have been improbable in the previous decade, resulted in a case on
the judicial agenda that might not have existed otherwise. This illus-
tration is important for the theory that courts depend on policy entre-
preneurs to pay attention to the information contained within recent
decisions to receive cases that are framed most appropriately for ex-
erting policy-making power in public areas that the [Jiustices consid-
er a priority.2 18
Only major, repeat purposive organizations can plausibly serve as
participant signalers in this field of operation, where their litigation
agenda requires a number of cases to establish and then effectuate the
larger organizational interests. In Baird's analysis, the organizations have
a role to play, and the Supreme Court Justices also have both a receptor
role and signaling role; that is, by accepting (or denying) certiorari ap-
peals, the Court signals its willingness to consider the legal issue(s) im-
bedded within a case, thereby sending its receptiveness to those who
would weigh in-the legal policy entrepreneurs and purposive litigation
organizations. Through this symbiotic relationship, MALDEF had be-
come the organization expected to take up civil rights for this population
and the issues that demand resolution in the polity and space for political
discourse:
Proponents of minority rights, who have always depended on the su-
premacy of the federal government to protect minorities, had to make
the opposite legal argument when the federal government was re-
sponsible for restricting rights and the states were in the position of
protecting them. When MALDEF responded to indications of the
Court's priorities with a pro-states' rights argument, a federal court
was presented with a case involving states' rights that most likely
would not have been available to the judicial agenda. The implication
of this telling example is that the relationship between the Supreme
Court [J]ustices and policy entrepreneurs is symbiotic; the Supreme
Court provided information to MALDEF to help it develop an effec-
tive legal strategy, and MALDEF provided a federal court with a case
that it would not have otherwise been able to decide, thereby extend-
ing the power of [J]udiciary. 219
In the thirty years since 1982's Plyler, MALDEF has become the
case study of how a case can require stewardship and nurturing in its
incipient stages and its middle-age arc, rather like children require. In-
deed, when President Barack Obama announced DACA in June 2012, he
did so on the thirtieth anniversary of Plyler, drawing attention to it in
218. BAIRD, supra note 135, at 74.
219. Id. at 72.
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Department of Homeland Security press announcements. 22 0 DACA is
possible only because the Supreme Court determined in Plyler that these
undocumented children were community members entitled to equal pro-
tection and therefore deserved the same opportunities as did all children;
this inchoate phenomenon has eventually morphed into the DREAM Act
221movement and program.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite its modest beginnings in 1967 and 1968, MALDEF in rela-
tively short order developed broad and deep professional expertise in a
number of program areas where Supreme Court litigation has been the
chief focus. While it has always been a small organization, never em-
ploying more than fifteen or twenty full-time lawyers in all its regional
offices, it has marshaled these resources to establish itself as among the
premier players in a relatively broad array of technical areas and is wide-
ly viewed as being among the handful of civil rights organizations that
can be a repeat player and policy entrepreneur in constitutional litigation,
particularly in the domains of immigration, desegregation, voting rights,
educational finance, bilingual education, and other educational policy
areas such as testing, benefits, and corollary issues. Its early politicized
squabbling gave way to more stable and largely Latino legal staff, one
widely recognized as effective and expert.
Being a purposive organization serving Latino interests is a difficult
balancing act, made more difficult by the growing anti-Latino and re-
strictionist nativism that have arisen, particularly at the state and local
levels, and also by resource constraints from its being a freestanding and
not a membership organization, one funded by progressive foundations,
attorney fees, and other professional contributions. For one example,
when Arizona began enacting statewide anti-immigrant statutes,
MALDEF had to make the difficult decision to close its busy Atlanta
office, where it had cultivated a growing employment law and antidis-
crimination presence, to redeploy legal resources to the Southwest.222
Civil rights litigation, even when successful, can take many years and
additional sophisticated litigation to realize attorney fees. Serrano, where
MALDEF was not the main litigant organization, began in the late 1960s
and was won in 1971, but fees were not awarded until 1977.223 I some
states, it requires special state legislation to appropriate fees, a process
that can take several years.224 This business model is a very precarious
220. Olivas, Dreams Deferred, supra note 130, at 542; Preston, supra note 130.
221. Olivas, The Political Economy, supra note 130, at 1759; see also OLIVAS, supra note 38.
222. Press Release, MALDEF, MALDEF Shifts Operations in Southeast (Apr. 9, 2009) avail-
able at http://www.maldef.org/news/releases/southeast_040909/.
223. Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977) (awarding attorney fees).
224. For example, in Illinois, there is no common law principle that allows attorney's fees
either for costs or damages, and as a result, state courts do not award attorney's fees unless author-
ized by statute or by contractual agreement in advance. See Andrea Saltzman, A BriefLook at Statu-
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one, especially in the league where MALDEF plays, necessitating large
expenses up front for the cost of litigation, repayable at the back end only
if the plaintiffs prevail and the courts and legislators approve the expend-
itures years later. Undertaking this course of action is not for the faint of
heart or for the poor.
There are also daunting features of playing in the major leagues.
The status of social science research in important complex cases is often
vexing, especially if there is not a body of scholarship available or a co-
terie of experts willing to undertake the focused research needed for cas-
es. Of course, these will not always be Latino or Latina experts, the stag-
nant state of Mexican American academics, even in core areas, renders it
difficult to secure the expert testimony needed for high-stakes litigation.
The actual risk for clients is problematic, especially in immigration cas-
es, if the clients are not allowed to be styled anonymously, as occurred in
Plyler and other MALDEF litigation involving undocumented clients. 2 2 5
And public sentiment is always a consideration, especially in troubled
financial periods and anti-immigrant times, where there is rampant racial
violence and danger, which, in turn, makes fundraising development
work more difficult. Being a significant player in the public imagination,
especially the changing Latino polity, is always a balance of opportuni-
ties and disappointments. Perhaps the most difficult development is that
once a purposive organization moves into the top ranks, it is difficult to
maintain that status, especially when representing poor people's interests.
Thus, paradoxically, the more successful and visible the organization
becomes, the greater are the expectations. Simultaneously, the more suc-
cessful Mexican Americans become in society, the less likely they are to
see MALDEF or civil rights litigation as central to their lives or salient to
their interests. Demography may be destiny, but litigation is its likely
travel companion.
tory Attorney's Fees in Illinois, 73 ILL. B.J. 266 passim (1985). In addition, there are nearly 100 state
statutes that allow attorney's fees. See Andrea Saltzman, A Practical Guide to the Recovery ofAttor-
ney's Fees, 74 ILL. B.J. 124, 124 (1985).
225. Olivas, IMMIGRATION STORIES, supra note 39, at 203; cf Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating
Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REv. 247 passim (2001).
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